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Mankin v. Commonwealth3/24/2004
This is an appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) denying the statutory appeal of George L. Mankin (Licensee) of a one year suspension of his operator's license but sustaining his appeal of PennDOT's directive that Licensee equip all his vehicles with an ignition interlock device.
The facts giving rise to this appeal are not in dispute. On June 14, 2002, Licensee was arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI) for the third time. On November 26, 2002, PennDOT sent an official notice to Licensee advising him that as a result of his DUI conviction his driving privilege was being suspended for a period of one year effective October 28, 2002. The notice also advised Licensee that he was required to have all vehicles owned by him equipped with an ignition interlock system and that failure to comply with this requirement would result in the suspension of his license for an additional year.
Licensee filed a timely appeal with the trial court. A hearing de novo was held on February 24, 2003, after which the trial court entered an order sustaining the appeal as to the interlock requirement alone and denying Licensee's appeal of the one-year suspension of his operating privileges. The trial court relied upon Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) to hold that the sole authority for ordering the installation of the ignition interlock device is vested with the trial court and, therefore, PennDOT did not have the authority to order Licensee to install an ignition interlock device. The present appeal followed.
PennDOT raises two arguments on appeal. First, PennDOT asserts that it has a mandatory duty, independent from the authority of a court, not to restore the operating privilege of a repeat DUI offender unless and until that offender presents certification that he or she has complied with the Ignition Interlock Law. Second, PennDOT contends that the Ignition Interlock Law applied to Licensee even though it was not in effect when his first two DUI convictions occurred.
PennDOT acknowledges that the trial court was bound by this Court's holding in Schneider, but it maintains that Schneider, which is currently on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was wrongly decided. In the meantime, our Supreme Court recently decided Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, ___ Pa. ___, 834 A.2d 488 (2003), holding the Ignition Interlock Law to be unconstitutional in part. We must consider the trial court's holding in light of Mockaitis.
Prior to Mockaitis, this Court held that a licensee's appeal from imposition of an ignition interlock device by PennDOT should be sustained where that requirement had not been imposed by a court order at sentencing. See, e.g., Watterson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); McGrory v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 828 A.2d 506 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). In Mockaitis, our Supreme Court concluded that in the Ignition Interlock Law the legislature delegated executive branch responsibility to the courts of common pleas for regulating the operating privileges of repeat DUI offenders; this delegation was found unconstitutional. Consequently, the Court severed three provisions of the Law; specifically subsection 7002(b), subsection 7003(1), and the last clause of subsection 7003(5), which refers to subsection 7003(1), from the remainder of the Ignition Interlock Law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made clear that the statute's ignition interlock requ
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