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Commonwealth v. Lipinski1/7/2004
1 Appellant, Glenda Lipinski, appeals from the sentence imposed following her conviction of driving under the influence (DUI), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731. She raises several challenges to the constitutionality of Act 63 with respect to its provision for installation of ignition interlock devices, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7001-7003. After review, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
2 The facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows. During the early morning hours of December 22, 2001, Appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The responding officers detected signs of intoxication, and, following her transport to a local hospital for medical treatment, Appellant consented to chemical testing. Her blood alcohol content was above 0.10%.
3 Appellant subsequently entered a plea of guilty to DUI as a second offense. Her sentence, imposed on May 28, 2002, included a provision directing compliance with Act 63's requirements relating to an ignition interlock system. Appellant's motion to modify her sentence was denied, and this timely appeal followed.
4 Four issues are presented for our review.
I. WHETHER ACT 63 VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES BY INTERFERING WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL AS WELL AS BY TREATING SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS DIFFERENTLY.
II. WHETHER ACT 63 VIOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THAT IT DEPRIVES A LICENSEE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE CHALLENGING WHETHER THERE WAS A PRIOR DUI CONVICTION, WHETHER INTERLOCK DEVICES ARE PROPERLY INSTALLED, OR ANY EVIDENCE REGARDING OWNERSHIP OR LACK OF OWNERSHIP REGARDING ANY SPECIFIC VEHICLE AND CREATES A REQUIREMENT THAT THE IGNITION INTERLOCK BE INSTALLED ON PARTICULAR VEHICLES.
III. WHETHER ACT 63 VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE BY SEIZING FOR THE LEGISLATURE POWER TO PRESCRIBE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS.
IV. WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 3 BY ENACTING A BILL CONTAINING MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT.
Appellant's brief at 4.
5 This Court recently explained our review of a trial court's sentence where the statutory authority therefor is challenged.
Our Court's "authority to review a sentence is governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781." Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 1998)(en banc). "If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction." Commonwealth v. Alexander, 811 A.2d 1064, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 822 A.2d 703 (Pa. 2003).
Commonwealth v. Randal, 2003 PA Super. 465 (filed December 1, 2003)(other citations omitted).
6 Our Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Act 63 in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, ___ Pa. ___, 834 A.2d 488, 2003 Pa. LEXIS 1908 (2003). There, the defendant had challenged the ignition interlock requirements set forth in the Act, and the trial court found certain of its provisions unconstitutional. On appeal, our Supreme Court agreed that the doctrine of the separation of powers was violated by Act 63 because it delegated executive functions to the judiciary. However, the Court found the offensive provisions were severable from the remainder of the Act:
Here, severing those portions of Act 63 which effectuate the delegation to the sentencing court of the license restoration-related executive responsibilities of ordering installation of the devices and certifying that they have been installed does not render the remainder of the statute incapable of execution in accordance with legislative intent. Our separati
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