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Caparro v. Commonwealth2/11/2004
ement of the Act notwithstanding the lack of a court order, and that because Caparro's third DUI conviction occurred after the Act went into effect, that the application of the Act to Caparro does not violate the general rule against the retroactive application of a new statute.
DOT asserts that when it submitted the certified copy of the DL-21 form that indicated the ignition interlock was required, a presumption arose that the information was accurate and that Caparro needed to introduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Mateskovich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 755 A.2d 100 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). DOT asserts that Caparro failed to meet this burden.
This Court disagrees. Caparro testified that there was a "disparity in the sentencing order and the fact that the Clerk of Courts had ordered the ignition interlock we agreed to do a continuance so I could have this matter clarified." N.T. at 8; R.R. at 19a. Caparro then produced and submitted into evidence the sentencing order from the sentencing court which does not mention the ignition interlock requirement. The trial court determined that Caparro was not ordered to install the ignition interlock device. The trial court is the finder of fact. Questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court to determine. Schlata v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 744 A.2d 814 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). This Court is satisfied that the trial court did not err when it determined that the sentencing court did not impose the ignition interlock requirement and that Caparro successfully met his burden.
Next, DOT contends that it has an independent mandatory duty, which is not dependent upon the existence of a court order, not to restore the operating privilege of a repeat DUI offender unless and until the offender presents certification that the offender has complied with the law.
Beginning with Schneider, this Court has consistently held that DOT lacks the independent authority to order installation of ignition interlock devices without a court order based on the Act.
In Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, __ Pa. __, 834 A.2d 488 (2003), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the portions of the Act which required the sentencing court to order installation of ignition interlock devices and to certify to DOT that the licensee complied with the order were unconstitutional. Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court severed the unconstitutional portions of the Act and stated that Section 7003(2) of the Act remained in force: "With these provisions severed, the legislation still requires recidivist DUI offenders seeking restoration of driving privileges to apply to the Department for an ignition interlock restricted license." Id. at __, 834 A.2d at 502.
Pursuant to Mockaitis, DOT still has the authority to issue interlock restricted licenses but does not have the authority to require the installation of ignition interlock devices. The trial court did not err.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 2004, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
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