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Evans v. State5/25/2004
Following a bench trial in the State Court of Forsyth County, Nicole Beth Evans was found guilty of DUI--less safe driver; DUI--excessive blood alcohol content ("BAC"); failure to maintain a lane; and driving on a suspended license. She appeals, claiming error in the consideration of evidence obtained without benefit of Miranda; [FN1] the denial of her motion to suppress evidence found during an impound search of her car; and the consideration of a Georgia Crime Information Center ("GCIC") printout to establish age and notice of license suspension. Finding these claims to be without merit, we affirm.
FN1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
**673 1. In her first enumeration of error, Evans argues that the statutory definition of arrest contained in OCGA § 17-4-1 [FN2] is so broad that it encompasses any situation in which a suspect is detained by law enforcement to the extent that the suspect is not free "to come and go as she pleases." Therefore, Evans argues, she was under the functional equivalent of arrest "from the moment the detaining officer directed her with flashing blue lights to pull to the side of the road," and the results of her field sobriety evaluations were inadmissible as given without benefit of Miranda warnings. We cannot agree.
FN2. Actions constituting an arrest. An actual touching of a person with a hand is not essential to constitute a valid arrest. If the person voluntarily submits to being considered under arrest or yields on condition of being allowed his freedom of locomotion, under the discretion of the officer, the arrest is complete. OCGA § 17-4-1.
The provisions of OCGA § 17-4-1 were made part of our original Code of 1863 [FN3] and have long been interpreted as meaning an arrest is accomplished whenever the liberty of a person to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be. [FN4] This remains the law. But over the years, case law has refined and clarified what constitutes an "arrest" for purposes of constitutional analysis. [FN5] In that regard, an investigative "detention" is not an "arrest" so as to trigger the constitutional protections embodied in Miranda. [FN6] As we have previously explained,
FN3. Orig.Code 1863, § 4609.
FN4. Clements v. State, 226 Ga. 66, 67(2), 172 S.E.2d 600 (1970).
FN5. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).
FN6. Tolliver v. State, 273 Ga. 785, 786, 546 S.E.2d 525 (2001).
When a person is placed in custody or under arrest at a traffic stop, the protection of Miranda arises; however, roadside *707 questioning at a routine stop does not constitute a custodial arrest. A detained individual is not under arrest simply because, by leaving, he could be arrested for violating state law. Nor is he under arrest because an officer has discovered the commission of a traffic offense for which he could be arrested. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable only after a detainee's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. [FN7]
FN7. (Citations omitted.) Smith v. State, 236 Ga.App. 548, 550, 512 S.E.2d 19 (1999), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 83, 526 S.E.2d 59 (2000).
On appeal, then, this Court must determine whether a challenged detention involves the degree of restraint associated with a formal arrest. In doing so, we apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonable person would feel so restrained as to equate the detention to a formal arrest. [FN8] Notably, a "reasonable person" has been defined as one "neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances."
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