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Rinnegan v. Commonwealth3/16/2004
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT), appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court), dated February 25, 2003, sustaining the appeal of John Arthur Finnegan, Jr. (Licensee) to the extent that it challenged DOT's requirement that he install an ignition interlock system on all vehicles owned by him as a condition to having his operating privileges restored. We affirmed the order of the trial court on October 17, 2003, and, thereafter, on December 4, 2003, we granted DOT's application for reconsideration to address the applicability of our ruling in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, ___ Pa. ___, 834 A.2d 488 (2003). We affirm.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Licensee was originally arrested on February 6, 1986, for driving under the influence (DUI), in violation of Section 3731(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731. (R.R. at 26a). Licensee was arrested for DUI a second time on August 9, 1986. (R.R. at 26a). Licensee was convicted of both of these DUI offenses on November 20, 1986. (R.R. at 26a). As a result of these convictions, Licensee's operating privilege was suspended for two consecutive one-year periods. (R.R. at 26a). Licensee's operating privilege was restored by DOT in May, 1992. (R.R. at 27a).
On January 29, 2002, Licensee was arrested for his third DUI offense. (R.R. at 24a, 27a). Consistent with his plea of guilty, Licensee was convicted on July 2, 2002. (R.R. at 18a, 24a, 27a). The criminal division of the trial court sentenced Licensee to forty-eight hours to twenty-three months of confinement; a $300.00 fine; an EMS assessment of $10.00; a CAT Fund surcharge of $50.00; and costs of prosecution. (R.R. at 18a). The trial court did not impose upon Licensee the ignition interlock requirement found at Section 7002(b) of the Ignition Interlock Device Act (Act). (R.R. at 18a, 24a). Additionally, it does not appear from the record that the local district attorney appealed the trial court's failure to impose such a requirement.
By notice dated October 18, 2002, DOT notified Licensee that, as a consequence of his conviction on July 2, 2002, his operating privilege was being suspended for a one-year period pursuant to Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(b)(3). (R.R. at 21a-23a). That notice also advised Licensee that he was required by law to have all vehicles owned by him to be equipped with an ignition interlock system in order for his operating privilege to be restored at the end of that period and, if he failed to comply with this requirement, his operating privilege would remain suspended for an additional year. (R.R. at 21a-23a). Licensee filed a timely statutory appeal from that suspension notice with the trial court.
A de novo hearing was conducted by the trial court on February 20, 2003. The trial court upheld the imposition of the one-year suspension pursuant to Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code, but relieved Licensee from the requirement that he equip his vehicles with ignition interlock systems as a prerequisite to restoration of his driving privilege. (R.R. at 15a-16a, 31a). DOT filed a notice of appeal from that order and we affirmed.
On reconsideration to this Court, DOT now argues that the ruling in Mockaitis establishes that the requirement of the installation of an ignition interlock device is a license restoration requirement. Therefore, DOT argues that its requirement that a licensee install ignition interlock devices as a condition of restoration of an operating privilege is not merely a continuation
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