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Bartley v. Commonwealth2/12/2004
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (common pleas) that sustained the appeal of Gregory Bartley from the requirement that he install ignition interlock devices on all vehicles that he owns before his operating privileges could be restored. Common pleas considered Bartley's appeal nunc pro tunc over the Department's objection and, citing Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), ruling on petition for allowance of appeal reserved, No. 80 MAL 2002 (filed May 9, 2003), ruled that the Department lacked the authority to impose the interlock requirement absent a court order. We vacate and remand with instructions that common pleas quash Bartley's appeal as untimely.
Bartley pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731. Bartley's record revealed prior DUI convictions and, therefore, common pleas sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, imposed a fine and community service and directed that installation of interlock devices be a condition of license restoration. On March 20, 2002, the Department notified Bartley that his operating privilege was suspended for one year and that prior to the restoration thereof he would need to install interlock devices on his vehicles. The Department imposed the ignition interlock requirement as a condition of license restoration pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Ignition Interlock Device Act (Act), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7001-7002. Bartley did not appeal from this suspension notice within the statutory period.
However, subsequently, Bartley sought nunc pro tunc modification of the sentence. With the consent of the district attorney, common pleas granted the request on May 13, 2003, and vacated the imposition of the interlock condition. One week later, Bartley filed an appeal from the Department's imposition of the interlock requirement. Therein, he asserted that his appeal was timely because "the imposition of the Ignition Interlock Device requirement by the Department is Void Ab Initio" inasmuch as the Department has no right to independently impose the requirement in disregard of the amended sentence. Common pleas decided Bartley's appeal, not as timely, but as permitted nunc pro tunc under the rationale applied in Watterson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (ruling that only the court had the power to impose the interlock restriction and thus the Department's refusal to restore a license absent compliance with the interlock requirement was void ab initio). In so doing, common pleas erred.
In Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, ___ Pa. ___, 834 A.2d 488 (2003), our Supreme Court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional insofar as it delegated executive responsibility in connection with the restoration of operating privileges to the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Based on this conclusion, the Supreme Court severed the three provisions from the Act concerning the requirement that sentencing courts order installation of the ignition interlock systems. Importantly, and relevant to the present appeal, the Supreme Court emphasized that notwithstanding its severance of those three sections of the Act, the Act's ignition interlock requirement was still viable and enforceable. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:
With these provisions severed, the legislation still requires recidivist DUI offenders seeking restoration of driving privileges to apply to the Department for an ignition interlock restricted license. 42 Pa. C.S. § 7003(2).
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