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Rutch v. Commonwealth1/14/2004
Eugene A. Rutch appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County that dismissed his statutory appeal from a one-year suspension of his driver's license imposed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) following Rutch's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI). Rutch questions whether the trial court erred by not following the mandates of Section 1550(c) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §1550(c), that is, by failing to schedule the license suspension hearing upon sixty days' written notice, and whether there was insufficient evidence to deny the license suspension appeal.
Rutch was convicted on October 30, 2000 in the trial court of violating Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §3731, and he appealed that conviction to the Superior Court. By notice dated December 12, 2000, DOT suspended Rutch's driving privilege for one year effective January 16, 2001 based upon that conviction, pursuant to Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §1532(b)(3). Rutch filed a statutory appeal from the suspension on January 11, 2001, which the trial court denied on January 12 without holding a hearing. Rutch appealed, and by order of March 1, 2001 the Court granted DOT's motion for remand for a hearing. On March 2 the trial court scheduled a hearing on remand for March 5. Rutch's counsel sought a continuance, and the hearing was rescheduled for March 9. At that hearing DOT offered into evidence a packet of documents, including a photocopy of notice to DOT of Rutch's conviction. On March 12 the trial court again denied Rutch's appeal.
Rutch appealed and also moved for a supersedeas of the trial court's order pending the resolution of his criminal appeal, which this Court granted on May 17, 2001. The Court further granted Rutch's uncontested motion for stay of briefing schedule by order of May 29, 2001, pending resolution of the underlying criminal matter and/or exhaustion of Rutch's appellate rights. In a motion to vacate the stay of briefing schedule and the supersedeas, DOT alleged that the Superior Court affirmed the DUI conviction on January 18, 2002, that it denied re-argument on March 26, 2002 and that on June 3, 2003 the Supreme Court denied Rutch's petition for allowance of appeal. Rutch admitted these allegations in his answer. By order of July 1, 2003, the Court granted DOT's motion to vacate the stay of briefing schedule but denied the motion to vacate supersedeas. The Court denied DOT's second motion to vacate supersedeas and Rutch's motion for oral argument.
Rutch first asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order scheduling the matter for a hearing because the remand order from this Court had not been received and entered upon the docket of the trial court until March 6, 2001. DOT responds that Pa. R.A.P. 2591(a) provides as a general rule:"On remand of the record the court or other government unit shall proceed in accordance with the judgment or other order of the appellate court and, except as otherwise provided in such order, Rule 1701(a) (effect of appeals generally) shall no longer be applicable to the matter." DOT stresses that the March 1, 2001 remand order included the statement"Jurisdiction relinquished," and it contends, and the Court agrees, that by operation of Rule 2591(a) and the terms of the remand order, the trial court regained jurisdiction of the matter on March 1, 2001.
Rutch's second contention concerning the scheduling of the hearing is that it violated Section 1550(c) of the Vehicle Code, which provides in part:"The court shall set the matter for hearing upon 60 days' written notice to the departmentà."
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