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Booz v. Commonwealth3/2/2004
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) sustaining Charles Booz's (Licensee) statutory appeal from PennDOT's requirement that he equip his vehicles with an ignition interlock device pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. §§7001-7003 (Interlock Act). Although we originally affirmed by memorandum opinion, reconsideration was granted to consider the effect of our Supreme Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, ___ Pa. ___, 834 A.2d 488 (2003). Because we determine Licensee's appeal was untimely, we vacate and remand with direction to quash.
The facts remain undisputed. Over a period of two years, Licensee was convicted of violating 75 Pa. C.S. §3731 (pertaining to driving under the influence ) twice. The most recent arrest was in November 2000, prior to the enactment of the Interlock Act.
During the most recent sentence, in April 2001, the sentencing court did not order the installation of ignition interlock devices on his vehicles. Nevertheless, on May 9, 2001, PennDOT sent Licensee a notice advising him that before the reinstatement of his driving privileges he was required to "have all vehicle(s) . . . equipped with an Ignition Interlock System. . . . If you fail to comply with this requirement, your driving privilege will remain suspended for an additional year." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 28a.
Eight months after the notice, Licensee filed a statutory appeal with the trial court arguing PennDOT lacked the authority to order the installation of the ignition interlock device without a trial court order. Relying on Schneider v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), and Watterson v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), the trial court granted Licensee's appeal.
PennDOT appealed presenting three arguments. First, it asserted the trial court erred in allowing Licensee's appeal to proceed when it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the un-timeliness of the petition. Second, PennDOT argued the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to recognize its independent mandate under Section 7003 of the Interlock Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §7003, to enforce the ignition interlock requirement even in the absence of a court order. Finally, PennDOT asserted the Interlock Act applies to offenses occurring prior to its effective date.
Finding no independent authority to order interlock installation, this Court affirmed. Of particular importance for present purposes, we concluded a late appeal was permitted because PennDOT lacked authority to require installation of an ignition interlock device. Booz v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (No. 1051 C.D. 2003, filed October 7, 2003).
Subsequently, our Supreme Court decided Mockaitis, holding PennDOT enjoys statutory authority to restrict license restoration of repeat DUI offenders independent of a sentencing order from a trial court. On PennDOT's motion, reconsideration was granted.
PennDOT asserts that Mockaitis dispels the basis for permitting a late appeal. We agree.
Beginning with Watterson, we permitted untimely appeals because PennDOT lacked independent statutory authority to require interlock installation and because, absent a court order, the interlock imposition was void. 816 A.2d at 1227. However, the rationale in Watterson for permitting an untimely appeal is no longer valid. More specifically, in Mockaitis our Supreme Court held that PennDOT enjoys statutory authority to restrict license restoration of repeat DUI offenders that does not depend on a sentencing or
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