 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Byrd v. Commonwealth2/11/2004
SUBMITTED: November 21, 2003
OPINION NOT REPORTED
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (common pleas) that sustained the appeal of Oliver R. Byrd from the requirement that he install an ignition interlock device on all vehicles that he owns before his operating privilege could be restored. The Department imposed the ignition interlock requirement pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Ignition Interlock Device Act (Act), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7001-7003. Common pleas sustained Byrd's appeal based upon this court's decision in Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), ruling on petition for allowance of appeal reserved (No. 80 MAL 2002, filed May 9, 2003), wherein this court held, among other things, that the Department lacked the authority to require installation of an ignition interlock device absent a court order by common pleas. Id. at 366-67. Because we conclude that Byrd's statutory appeal to common pleas was untimely, depriving common pleas of jurisdiction over the appeal, we vacate and remand with instructions that common pleas quash the appeal.
Byrd sustained his second conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731 of the Vehicle Code on November 13, 2001. When the common pleas judge sentenced Byrd, he did not require Byrd to install an ignition interlock device as provided for in 42 Pa. C.S. § 7002. There is no evidence that the Commonwealth or Byrd appealed the judgment of sentence.
The Department then sent Byrd a notice of suspension dated December 26, 2001, advising Byrd that his driving privilege was suspended for one year, and that he was required to have all vehicles owned by him equipped with an ignition interlock device before his driving privilege could be restored, otherwise his driving privilege would be suspended for an additional year. Byrd did not file an appeal from this suspension notice. On October 21, 2002, the Department sent Byrd a "Restoration Requirements Letter" outlining the steps that he would need to take in order to restore his operating privilege. Included therein was the requirement that he equip his vehicles with an ignition interlock device. Thereafter, on November 18, 2002, Byrd filed an appeal contending that the Department lacked the authority to require that he install ignition interlock devices on his vehicles prior to the restoration of his driving privilege. At the de novo hearing that followed, the Department offered into evidence certified documents, which included the report of conviction and the December 26, 2001 notice of suspension, and then rested. Byrd's attorney then argued:
We are here on a legal argument that you have heard. Once again, in that packet of documents there is a Report of the Clerk of Courts, I believe it's the fifth page in the document already presented, indicating under Section G, Act 63, ignition interlock required, no.
Nonetheless, my client received a restoration requirement letter on October 21 of 2002, advising him of the ignition interlock requirement. This appeal followed within 30 days, based upon the Schneider case, whereby PennDOT doesn't have independent authority to order the ignition interlock restoration requirement.
Hearing on February 19, 2003, Notes of Testimony at 3. Based upon Schneider, common pleas sustained Byrd's appeal and ordered the Department to restore Byrd's operating privilege upon the completion of his suspension and satisfaction of requirements other than the installation of an ignition interlock device. This appeal
Page 1 2 Pennsylvania DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|