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Westcott v. Commonwealth3/23/2004
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) that denied in part and granted in part the appeal of Nelson G. Westcott (Westcott) of the suspension of his operating privilege with an ignition interlock requirement. The trial court denied the appeal of the operating privilege suspension and granted the appeal of the ignition interlock restoration requirement and rescinded the requirement that Westcott comply with requirements of the Act as a condition to the restoration of his operating privilege.
In 1986, Westcott was charged with violating 75 Pa. C.S. §3731(a). On August 18, 1986, he accepted Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for this offense. On January 16, 1986, Westcott was charged with violating 75 Pa. C.S. §3731(a). On April 27, 1987, he was convicted of this offense. On October 11, 1986, Westcott was again charged with violating 75 Pa. C.S. §3731(a). Westcott was convicted of this offense on April 27, 1987. As a result of his conviction of the October 11, 1986 offense, PennDOT revoked Westcott's operating privileges for five years, pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. §1542(d) (relating to habitual offenders). On July 5, 2002, Westcott was charged with violating 75 Pa. C.S. §3731(a) and, on November 6, 2002, he was convicted of that offense. The sentencing order imposed by the Honorable Juan R. Sanchez did not contain any requirement that Westcott comply with the Ignition Interlock Act. Additionally, the clerk of courts report filed pursuant to Section 6323 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code expressly revealed that compliance with Act 63 (Ignition Interlock) was not required. On January 22, 2003, Westcott filed a timely appeal of PennDOT's action. By order dated April 21, 2003, the trial court sustained Westcott's appeal as to the ignition interlock requirement. The trial court relied on this Court decision in Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), and determined that PennDOT lacked the authority to impose ignition interlock requirements where the sentencing court failed to do so.
Since this Court's decision in Schneider, we have consistently held that PennDOT lacks the independent authority to order installation of ignition interlock devices without a court order based on the Act. See, e.g., Sloan v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 822 A.2d 105 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Conroy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 825 A.2d 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, ___ Pa. ___, 834 A.2d 488 (2003), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that portions of the Act that required the sentencing court to order installation of ignition interlock devices were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court struck Section 7002(b), requiring the trial court to order installation of the device as a predicate for restoration of a license; Section 7003(a), requiring the court to certify installation had occurred; and the last clause of Section 7003(5), which referred to Section 7003(1) and stated that the Act remained enforceable by PennDOT under Section 7003(2).
The trial court was correct in finding PennDOT exceeded its statutory authority when it required Westcott to install ignition interlock devices on all vehicles he owns. We note that the Pennsylvania legislature has passed Act 24 of 2003, which amends Section 7002(b) of the Act to give PennDOT independent authority to require installation of ignition interlock devices. However, the Act specifically applies only when a second or subsequent DUI violation occurs after September 30, 200
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