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State v. Dearmas2/13/2004
We review here a Superior Court order granting the state's motion to seize a blood sample from the petitioner, Jose Dearmas, as well as a search warrant issued by that same court to the same effect. The petitioner is a defendant in a pending criminal case charging him with two counts of first-degree child molestation. The state requested and obtained the blood-seizure order and search warrant because it sought to conduct tests on the petitioner's blood to ascertain whether the petitioner's DNA matched the DNA obtained from body-fluid evidence that the perpetrator left at the crime scene after he molested the victim. In asking us to quash the blood-seizure order and search warrant, the petitioner argues that the Superior Court exceeded its authority in granting the motion and issuing the warrant because a blood sample does not constitute "property" as that term is used in G.L. 1956 § 12-5-2, the statute that defines the grounds upon which trial-court judges may issue search warrants for the seizure of certain types of evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the petitioner and hold that blood seized from an unconsenting person does not constitute "property" as that term is used in § 12-5-2. Accordingly, we reverse, quash the blood-seizure order and the warrant, and remand this case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Travel
On August 27, 2001, a grand jury indicted petitioner, charging him with two counts of first-degree child molestation. The Superior Court arraigned petitioner and he pled not guilty. Thereafter, on January 29, 2002, the state asked the Providence County Superior Court to issue an order "granting the seizure of blood" from petitioner. The petitioner objected to this request, and the court held a hearing on the state's motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Superior Court granted the state's request, issued a blood-seizure order, and instructed the state to apply for the issuance of a search warrant. After the state did so, the court issued the warrant, but stayed its execution pending our review of the legality of the order and warrant. On March 26, 2002, a duty justice of this Court stayed the Superior Court blood-seizure order. Thereafter, on March 28, 2002, this Court issued an order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari and continued the stay until further order of this Court.
Analysis
The narrow question before us today is whether the Superior Court exceeded its jurisdiction under § 12-5-2 by issuing an order granting the state's motion to seize a sample of petitioner's blood, authorizing the state to apply for a search warrant to effectuate this seizure, and then issuing a search warrant for the police to seize a vial of petitioner's blood. In State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 2000), a majority of this Court noted that "the Superior Court is statutory in origin and derives its powers from statutes duly enacted by the Legislature." Id. at 1167-68, 1168 n.27 (quoting R.I. Const. art. 10, sec. 2, which provides: "The inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law."). Thus, the Superior Court does not possess any inherent authority to issue blood-seizure orders or to authorize the use of search warrants to accomplish such seizures; instead, it may exercise only those powers that the General Assembly has granted to it. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1168 (citing Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System, 567 A.2d 358, 361 (R.I. 1989)).
Section 12-5-1(a) and G.L. 1956 § 8-3-6 vest the justices of the District and Superior Courts with the authority to issue search warrants. Section 1
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