 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Villella3/24/2004
to OCGA § 42-8-110(a), "the term 'ignition interlock
device' means a constant monitoring device certified by the commissioner of motor vehicle safety which prevents a motor vehicle from being started at any time without first determining the equivalent blood alcohol concentration of the operator through the taking of a deep lung breath sample. The system shall be calibrated so that the motor vehicle may not be started if the blood alcohol concentration of the operator, as measured by the device, exceeds 0.02 grams or if the sample is not a sample of human breath."
**565 The State argues that the statutory language requiring an ignition interlock order as a condition of probation is mandatory in this circumstance and that the trial court did not make a finding of "financial hardship," which was required before it could exempt Villella from the ignition interlock device. We agree.
*501 In construing a statute, the goal is to ascertain its legislative intent and meaning. Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981). "Statutes should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions, for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation." Integon Indem. Corp. v. Canal Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 692, 693, 353 S.E.2d 186 (1987). "When a statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it but must construe it according to its terms." Richmond County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Ga. R. Bank & Trust Co., 242 Ga. 23, 24, 247 S.E.2d 761 (1978). See also City of Atlanta v. Miller, 256 Ga.App. 819, 820(1), 569 S.E.2d 907 (2002) (Barnes, J.); Ga. Institute of Technology v. Gore, 167 Ga.App. 359- 360, 306 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
In 1999, as a response to the death of Heidi Flye and her two small children in an automobile accident involving a drunk driver, the Georgia General Assembly enacted Heidi's Law to, among other things, strengthen laws requiring the installation and use of ignition interlock devices to prevent persons convicted of DUI from driving vehicles not equipped with the device. See Ga. L. 1999 pp. 391-393. In 2000, the statute was amended, effective May 1, 2000, and the subsection relating to installation of certified ignition interlock device as a condition of probation was rewritten from "Except as otherwise provided in this article, the court may order the installation of a certified ignition interlock device on any vehicle which any person subject to subsection (a) of this Code section owns or operates," (emphasis supplied) to the present shall language. See OCGA § 42-8-111(a); compare Ga. L. 1999, pp. 391, 399-400, § 12.
This statute is plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction--shall means shall and there is no discretion to exercise absent financial hardship.
The trial court erred in not including the ignition lock order as a condition of probation.
Judgment reversed.
Page 1 2 Georgia DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|