State v. Gomez3/22/2004
In February 2002, the solicitor-general of Gwinnett County filed an accusation against Roberto Duran Gomez for driving under the influence of alcohol, OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) and (5), as well as other traffic violations. The trial court subsequently ordered that all evidence resulting from the traffic stop be excluded at trial, and the State appeals. We find the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, because Gomez's motion was both untimely and legally insufficient, and because the police officer had a sufficient legal basis for stopping Gomez. Therefore, we reverse.
The record shows that, at approximately 5:15 a.m. on October 20, 2001, a Gwinnett County police dispatcher transmitted a lookout for a red Honda Prelude, tag number **511 588ZJC, traveling northbound on Interstate 85. A citizen had reported that the vehicle was "all over the *424 roadway," and the driver appeared to be intoxicated. A Gwinnett County police officer observed a red Honda Prelude on an exit ramp from northbound I-85, confirmed that the tag number matched that given in the lookout, followed the car briefly without observing any traffic violations, then pulled the driver over. The officer arrested Gomez for DUI, failure to maintain a lane, failure to yield, and not having a valid driver's license.
The State arraigned Gomez on April 15, 2002. Three days later, Gomez filed a generic motion to suppress, asserting that officers violated his constitutional rights when they searched his home without a valid warrant and asking that the fruits of this search be suppressed. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that the motion was invalid because it was untimely filed and did not raise any legal issues that were relevant to this case. It is clear from the accusation that the charges only involved traffic violations, and it is undisputed that there had been no search of Gomez's home. Therefore, there was no evidence to be suppressed pursuant to any such search. Further, even when read broadly, the motion did not raise any issue of whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop. [FN1]
FN1. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
In response to the State's objections to the court's consideration of his motion, Gomez conceded that the motion was "very broad," and was "more of a drug suppression motion than it is for a DUI case," [FN2] but asked the court to rule upon it anyway. Then, changing his argument midstream, Gomez asked the court to suppress all evidence based upon a finding that there was no probable cause for his arrest. Eventually, the trial court determined sua sponte that the real issue to be decided in this case was whether there was sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. The court found that there was no evidence that the concerned citizen who first reported Gomez's erratic driving had an ulterior motive, and that there did not appear to be an issue as to whether the citizen was reliable. Even so, the trial court held that, because the officer did not actually see Gomez commit a traffic offense or otherwise corroborate the citizen's report, the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the traffic stop. The court then granted Gomez's motion to suppress.
FN2. There were no drugs involved in this case.
1. On appeal, the State challenges the court's order, arguing that Gomez waived a motion to suppress because he did not timely file the motion and, then, failed to secure the court's written extension of time to file. Under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1, "[a]ll motions, *425 demurrers, and special pleas shall be made and filed at or before tim
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