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Parker v. State6/30/2004
he suspended license charge, apparently as part of the plea bargain.
The propriety of the Investigative Stop
As we have described, Trooper Barlow activated his patrol vehicle's overhead lights when he approached Parker's car. Barlow continued to run his overhead lights when he followed Parker down the road for two hundred feet, and when he then drove past Parker, made a U-turn, and stopped his patrol vehicle on the roadway in front of Parker.
The State argues that the ensuing interaction between Barlow and Parker did not amount to an investigative stop, but was merely a "contact". We reject this argument. Under these facts, a reasonable person in Parker's position would have believed that they were not free to go. We therefore agree with Parker that he was subjected to an investigative stop. The question is whether this investigative stop was justifiable under the facts known to Barlow.
Barlow observed a car sitting in a ditch beside the road, facing the wrong way. Barlow could reasonably surmise that the car was in the ditch as a result of someone's careless driving. As Barlow approached the car with his overhead lights on, Parker darted from the car and began running away from the scene. Under these facts, Barlow had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had just occurred, and that Parker had either participated in that criminal activity or had knowledge of it.
As this court explained in State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452 (Alaska App. 1989):
he Coleman rule [i.e., the rule authorizing investigative stops - see Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976)] is ultimately rooted in common sense and practicality. In each case, compliance with Coleman's requirement of recently committed serious harm must be evaluated with a view toward the fundamental concern of the Coleman court: the risk that an investigative stop based on mere suspicion may be used as a pretext to conduct a search for evidence. As indicated in Coleman, the fundamental inquiry in each case is whether "a prompt investigation required ... as a matter of practical necessity."
Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
Under the circumstances presented here, Barlow was entitled to detain Parker briefly to question him about how the car happened to end up in the ditch.
In addition, as the superior court noted, this investigative stop can be justified by Barlow's caretaker function. As we observed in Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9 (Alaska App. 1986):
Local police officers ... frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Id. at 10-11.
The encounter between Barlow and Parker occurred on a mid-December evening in Fairbanks; in other words, it was cold and dark. Barlow observed a car in a ditch, apparently disabled. When Barlow saw Parker run from the ditch, Barlow could reasonably surmise that Parker had been either the driver of, or a passenger in, this car. Barlow could further reasonably surmise that Parker or some other potential occupant of the car might need assistance - either medical assistance or, at least, assistance with the car.
For both of these reasons, we conclude that the investigative stop was justified.
Parker's Claim of a Miranda Violation
Parker next argues that even if he was properly subjected to an investigative stop, Barlow was obliged to warn Parker of his rights under
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