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Ridlington v. State6/18/2004
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2002, Nenana Police Chief Milton J. Haken arrested Jeremy A. Ridlington for driving while intoxicated. Haken initially filed a misdemeanor DWI complaint against Ridlington in the Nenana district court. Later that same day, after Haken learned that Ridlington had two prior DWI convictions, he filed a second complaint - this one charging Ridlington with felony DWI (i.e., driving while intoxicated after having previously been convicted of DWI or breath-test refusal at least twice).
Two days after his arrest (i.e., on July 25), Ridlington appeared for arraignment in front of Nenana Magistrate Paul Verhagen. Ridlington was assisted by counsel, who appeared telephonically.
Ridlington and his attorney were aware that two complaints - the misdemeanor DWI complaint and the felony DWI complaint - had been filed against Ridlington based on the same conduct. Acting on the advice of his attorney, Ridlington attempted to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge - anticipating that his guilty plea to this lesser included charge would then bar the State from pursuing the felony charge. But because the felony charge was also pending, Magistrate Verhagen refused to allow Ridlington to plead guilty to the lesser included misdemeanor offense.
The following week, the State formally dismissed the misdemeanor complaint and the grand jury indicted Ridlington for felony DWI. After Ridlington was indicted, he attacked the felony charge on double jeopardy grounds. Ridlington argued (1) that the Nenana magistrate had had no authority to refuse to accept his offered guilty plea to the misdemeanor, and (2) that if he had been allowed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor, his plea would have barred the State from pursuing the felony charge. When the superior court rejected this argument, Ridlington pleaded no contest to felony DWI, reserving his right to raise this double jeopardy issue on appeal.
In his brief to this Court, Ridlington renews his contention that the magistrate had no right to refuse to allow him to enter a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge. But even if this were so, Ridlington would not be prejudiced by the magistrate's action unless Ridlington's second contention were also true - his contention that, had he succeeded in entering a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge, this would have barred the State from pursuing the felony charge.
Ridlington's second contention is, in fact, mistaken. The State could still prosecute Ridlington for felony DWI even if Ridlington had pleaded guilty on July 25 to the misdemeanor DWI charge.
In Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984), the defendant pleaded guilty to some of the charges in his indictment and then asserted that the double jeopardy clause barred the government from pursuing the remaining charges - because the charges to which the defendant had pleaded guilty were lesser included offenses of the remaining charges. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument:
Previously we have recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense when he has already been tried and acquitted or convicted on the lesser included offense. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).
...
We do not believe, however, that the principles of finality and prevention of prosecutorial overreaching applied in Brown reach [the present] case. No interest of respondent protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated by continuing prosecution on the remaining charges brought in the indictment. Here respondent offered only to resolve part of the
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