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Ridlington v. State6/18/2004
charges against him, while the State objected to disposing of any of the counts against respondent without a trial. Respondent has not been exposed to conviction on the charges to which he pleaded not guilty, nor has the State had the opportunity to marshal its evidence and resources more than once or to hone its presentation of its case through a trial. The acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser included offenses while charges on the greater offenses remain pending, moreover, has none of the implications of an "implied acquittal" which results from a verdict convicting a defendant on lesser included offenses rendered by a jury charged to consider both greater and lesser included offenses. [citations omitted] There simply has been none of the governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent. On the other hand, ending prosecution now would deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509, 98 S.Ct. 824, 832, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978).
... Here respondent's efforts were directed to separate disposition of counts in the same indictment where no more than one trial of the offenses charged was ever contemplated. Notwithstanding the trial court's acceptance of respondent's guilty pleas, respondent should not be entitled to use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining charges.
Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2542.
In Alley v. State, 704 P.2d 233, 235 (Alaska App. 1985), this Court endorsed this same resolution of the issue as a matter of state constitutional law.
Ridlington acknowledges that Ohio v. Johnson and Alley v. State are apparently counter to his contention in this appeal. But he points out that, unlike the situations in Johnson and Alley, the charges against him were not contained in the same charging document, but rather were contained in separate charging documents.
We do not view this as a material distinction. Both of the complaints against Ridlington were filed before he made his initial appearance in court. Ridlington and his attorney were well aware of the two complaints; indeed, Ridlington's motivation for trying to plead guilty to the misdemeanor complaint was to stop the State from pursuing the felony complaint that had already been filed. Under these circumstances, the reasoning and policies described by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Johnson apply with equal vigor to Ridlington's case.
We note that at least two federal circuits have concluded that Ohio v. Johnson applies to circumstances like these - situations in which the pending charges against the defendant are contained in more than one charging document. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 349-350 (4th Cir. 1996); and Bally v. Kemna, 65 F.3d 104, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1995). See also State v. Nickens (unpublished), 1993 WL 291731, *6 & n. 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
Given our resolution of the double jeopardy issue, we need not reach the question of whether a judicial officer has the authority to refuse to accept an offered guilty plea on grounds other than the possibility that the plea is not knowing and intelligent.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
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