State v. Stewart4/1/2004
anonymous tip, the reliability of information is enhanced when it is related by "'an ordinary citizen volunteers information which he has come upon in the ordinary course of his affairs, completely free of any possible ordinary gain.'" Gomez, 198 Ariz. 61, 15, 6 P.3d at 767, quoting State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 108 Ariz. 356, 364, 498 P.2d 444, 452 (1972). An informant's willingness to approach an officer and place oneself "in a position to be held accountable for intervention" heightens the reliability of the information provided. United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Gomez, 198 Ariz. 61, 16, 6 P.3d at 768 (describing "a 'truly anonymous' phone call" as one in which "'the informant has not placed his credibility at risk and can lie with impunity'"), quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1381, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 263 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The woman here signaled Wakefield as he drove and reported her concerns in a manner indicating her willingness to shed her veil of anonymity. In doing so, she also exposed herself to criminal liability for false reporting. See A.R.S. § 13-2907.01(A). The trial court did not err in implicitly concluding that the woman was a credible source of information.
Stewart also argues Wakefield lacked reasonable suspicion because he could not have reasonably suspected that Stewart had committed a crime based on the information the woman had given. Stewart suggests that his conduct, if it could be classified as criminal at all, squarely fell under the purview of A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(2). That statute prohibits a person from " ontinu to follow another person in or about a public place for no legitimate purpose after being asked to desist" if the person acts with "intent to harass or with knowledge that the person is harassing another person." Id. He points out that Wakefield did not know whether the woman had asked Stewart to stop following her.
But this distinction is immaterial. Wakefield knew that the woman had approached him, had placed her credibility at risk, and had related that Stewart would not "leave her alone." Although this certainly did not give Wakefield probable cause to arrest Stewart, we are faced only with the propriety of Wakefield's investigatory stop, not of Stewart's eventual arrest. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000) (probable cause for arrest more stringent standard than reasonable suspicion to stop person). On this record, Wakefield was entitled to initiate an investigation of Stewart, who was reportedly harassing the woman in a park after 11:00 p.m. and who had fled when Wakefield approached. See id. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 577 (unprovoked flight a factor in assessing reasonableness of investigatory stop).
Stewart also suggests Wakefield had not been justified in acting on the information because his behavior could have had an innocent explanation. But reasonable suspicion is not undermined merely because innocent explanations might exist. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S. Ct. 744, 753, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 752 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11-12 (1989). The trial court did not err in concluding that Wakefield had reasonable suspicion to stop Stewart.
Affirmed.
PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Judge
CONCURRING:
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Chief Judge
JOHN PELANDER, Presiding Judge
|