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Shoemake v. State3/18/2004
A jury found Dave Shoemake guilty of following too closely (OCGA § 40-6-49(a)) and two counts of driving under the influence *343 (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) and (5)). Shoemake appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of a blood test because the State destroyed his blood sample before he could independently test it and he was not given implied consent warnings at the time of his arrest. Shoemake also asserts insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the trooper who arrested him did not see him drive and the State failed to prove chain of custody for the blood sample showing a blood alcohol level of 0.178 grams. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Shoemake contends the trial court should have suppressed the test of his blood alcohol content because the State violated his due process rights by destroying the sample before he could test it independently. In order to prevail on this claim, Shoemake must show that the evidence was material and that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve it. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 676, 680(3), 449 S.E.2d 845 (1994); Milton v. State, 232 Ga.App. 672, 679(6), 503 S.E.2d 566 (1998). "Bad faith is a question of fact for the trial court to determine, and we will not disturb a trial court's finding on bad faith if there is any evidence to support it." Swanson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 551(1)(a), 545 S.E.2d 713 (2001). In this case, the trial court denied the motion to suppress because he presented no evidence the blood sample might have been exculpatory, and no evidence or even allegation of improper motive. The State Crime Lab destroyed the blood sample "as part of a normal purging process" more than a year after it had been taken from Shoemake. The trial court also denied the motion because the blood sample was destroyed over a year after defense counsel entered an appearance, during which time Shoemake made no attempt to test the sample. Compare State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga.App. 135, 537 S.E.2d 457 (2000) (defendant's destroyed urine sample initially tested negative for drugs and court order existed allowing defendant to test sample). As the findings are supported by the record, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
2. Shoemake contends the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the blood test results because he was not read the implied consent warning at the time of his arrest as required by Georgia law. See OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4); Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 300 S.E.2d 668 (1983).
When we review a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, the evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court; the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility are adopted unless *344 they are clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Williams, 225 Ga.App. 736, 737(1), 484 S.E.2d 775 (1997).
In this case, the arresting officer testified in a motion hearing that he read the implied consent warning to Shoemake after he arrested him. He further testified on cross-examination that it is his habit to always read the implied consent warning "before we get to the ride," meaning before he transports them from the scene. The officer testified **807 that he did not, however, have a distinct memory of where he read the implied consent warning to Shoemake.
Shoemake contends it is unclear from this record whether he was given his implied consent warning at the scene of his arrest or later at the hospital and that the results of his blood test were therefore inadmissible. We disagree. The officer's testimony about h
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