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State v. Guilliams5/28/2004
e State of Kansas from a prison escapee for costs incurred in capturing the escaped prisoner. The court found no bar to considering a governmental unit an aggrieved party for purposes of the statute, as we have, but concluded that "the legislature did not intend that the manpower costs incurred to capture an escaped prisoner be subject to a court order that a defendant reimburse the State." Id. We find this to be a sensible approach.
Certainly, the distinction between an escape in progress and one that has been successfully accomplished will often be mu rky; it will not always be clear when a trail has gone cold. But a "reasonableness" standard for attenuated causation is well-suited to guide any such line drawing, and, as w ith any such discretionary decision entrusted to the trial court, our review will be deferential. See Madrid, ___ Ariz. ___, 5, 85 P.3d at 1056 (in assigning restitution, trial court has "substantial discretion" in determining amount of econ omic loss).
Finally, we find the state's reliance on State v. Maupin, 166 Ariz. 250, 801 P.2d 485 (App. 1990), misplaced. The court in Maupin held that the trial court had authority under § 13-804 to order the defendant to pay his extradition costs as part of his sentence when the defendant had stipulated to do so in the plea agreement, notwithstanding that the court technically had not designated those costs as a fine. Although Guilliams agreed to pay restitution up to one million dollars as a term of his plea agreement, nothing in that provision suggests that he agreed to pay any restitution not warranted by Arizona law, and he clearly did not stipulate to pay for the costs associated with Hummert's apprehension. Guilliams opposed the restitution sought by the state both before it was ordered and in post-conviction relief proceedings, and in neither of the state's responses did it ever suggest that Guilliams had agreed to pay restitution unconditionally as a term of the plea agreement. See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-128676, 177 Ariz. 352, 868 P.2d 365 (App. 1994) (provision in plea agreement in which juvenile agreed to pay restitution up to a maximum of $750 if found legally responsible for the damages was not an unconditional agreement to pay restitution). Accordingly, Maupin is not dispositive. Moreover, as Guilliams correctly notes, Maupin also held that the state may not recover extradition costs through restitution ordered under the authority of § 13-603(C).
Disposition
"When an appellate court cannot determine the basis of the restitution order from the record, the proper remedy is to vacate that portion of the sentence, and remand to the trial court to reconsider the propriety of the restitution order and to specify the basis for its determination." State v. Iniguez, 169 Ariz. 538, 5 35, 821 P.2d 194, 199 (App. 1991). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's $47,626.55 restitution order in favor of ADOC and remand for a redetermination of that order consistent with this decision.
We grant the petition for review, and we grant partial relief.
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Chief Judge
CONCURRING:
JOHN PELANDER, Presiding Judge
PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Judge
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Arizona DUI Attorneys
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