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State v. Seaton4/28/2004
Defendant appeals from his conviction for operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). AFFIRMED.
Philip Jay Seaton appeals from his conviction for operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer did not have grounds to invoke implied consent, nor did he have probable cause to arrest. We review his claims de novo. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 510 (Iowa 1997).
Iowa State Patrol Trooper Breshears encountered Seaton at 12:30 a.m. on October 2, 2002. He observed Seaton traveling thirty-four miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour speed zone. Breshears activated his flashing lights and Seaton promptly stopped his vehicle.
When Breshears approached Seaton, he first smelled the strong odor of perfume emanating from the vehicle. As he conversed with Seaton, Breshears smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage. Breshears placed Seaton in his patrol car and noticed Seaton's eyes were red and bloodshot. He continued to smell the strong odor of alcoholic beverage. When asked, Seaton admitted to drinking a "few beers" that night.
Trooper Breshears asked Seaton to perform several field sobriety tests. Seaton failed each of them. Breshears noticed the maximum clues while performing Seaton's horizontal nystagmus test. Seaton also showed five out of eight clues on the walk-and-turn test. Finally, Seaton put his foot down twice during the one-legged stand, and counted incorrectly. A preliminary breath test performed on Seaton registered.126.
Breshears arrested Seaton for operating while intoxicated. Seaton was transported to the law enforcement center where he consented to a breath test. His blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Seaton was charged with operating while intoxicated, second offense, to which Seaton pled not guilty. Seaton filed a motion to suppress the breath test results. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Following a bench trial, Seaton was found guilty of operating while intoxicated.
Seaton contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Trooper Breshears did not have reasonable grounds for invoking implied consent. Iowa Code section 321J.6 outlines the requirements that must be met prior to invoking implied consent and requesting a driver submit to a chemical test.
The withdrawal of the body substances and the test or tests shall be administered at the written request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or 321J.2A, and if any of the following conditions exist:
a. A peace officer has lawfully placed the person under arrest for violation of section 321J.2.
...
d. The preliminary breath screening test was administered and it indicated an alcohol concentration equal to or in excess of the level prohibited by section 321J.2.
Iowa Code § 321J.6.
We conclude Trooper Breshears had reasonable grounds to believe Seaton was operating while intoxicated. After stopping Seaton for speeding, Breshears smelled a strong odor of perfume and noticed a bottle of perfume in the passenger seat. However, as Seaton spoke with the trooper, Breshears smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage. While sitting in his patrol car with the dome light on, Breshears noticed Seaton's eyes were red and bloodshot. Seaton's breath smelled strongly of alcoholic beverages and Seaton admitted to drinking a "few beers" that night. At that point,
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