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State v. Parker4/14/2004
The issue presented in this case is whether the ameliorative changes in Louisiana's habitual offender law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, apply only to those cases in which the defendant commits the charged crime after the effective date of the amending act or whether they can be applied to a defendant who is adjudicated a habitual offender after the effective date of the amending act, but whose crime was committed prior to the effective date of the amending act. Based on the language of the amending act, this court's well-settled jurisprudence, and the policy considerations involved, we conclude that the applicable habitual offender provisions are those that were in effect at the time of the commission of the charged offense. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the court of appeal's judgment to the contrary.
Facts and Procedural History
Defendant, Danny Parker, was charged by bill of information in count one with possession of a Schedule III controlled dangerous substance (Dihydrocodeinone) in violation of La. R.S. 40:968(C), and in count two with possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance (Diazepam) in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). The alleged offense occurred on March 25, 1997. Defendant pled not guilty to both counts, and was subsequently tried and convicted on both counts by a six-person jury.
Thereafter, the State filed a habitual offender bill, alleging with respect to count two that defendant was a third felony offender because he had previously pled guilty to aggravated battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:34 and he was previously convicted for distribution of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (cocaine) in violation of La. R.S. 40:967. Following a hearing, the district court adjudicated defendant as a third felony offender. On August 3, 1999, defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years at hard labor on count one and life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as a third felony offender on count two.
Defendant filed an appeal, and, on November 9, 2001, the court of appeal affirmed the convictions on both counts and the sentence on count one, but vacated the habitual offender adjudication and sentence on count two. The matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. State v. Parker, 00-2861 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/01), 818 So.2d 85.
On March 4, 2002, following a hearing on remand, the district court again adjudicated defendant a third felony offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Defendant objected to the sentence, arguing that it was excessive in light of changes in the habitual offender law that became effective after the time of the commission of the third felony offense and conviction, but before his re-adjudication as a habitual offender.
Defendant again appealed the habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and the court of appeal affirmed the habitual offender adjudication. State v. Parker, 02-1477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/5/03), 845 So.2d 546. However, the court of appeal vacated the habitual offender sentence because it concluded that defendant should have been sentenced according to the amended provisions of the habitual offender law that were in effect when he was properly adjudicated a third felony offender by the district court. Id. Although the court acknowledged that State v. Sugasti, 01-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, reiterated this court's consistent holding that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is deter
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