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State v. Parker4/14/2004
ouraged to delay proceedings to coincide with the effective dates of more lenient sentencing provisions. Either of these situations would wreak havoc with our sense of fairness, and, in a practical sense, with the dockets of the courts.
Finally, we recognize that the purpose of the provisions of Act 403 at issue was to reduce the sentences of certain habitual offenders in order to ease the financial burden on the state. We note, however, that the Act contains no indication that the legislature intended for the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), as amended by Act 403, to apply to all sentences imposed following the effective date of the statute. Thus, given the language employed in the Act, including the specific declaration that the provisions of the Act are to have prospective effect only, and the policy considerations explained above, we reaffirm the principles and analysis consistently employed in our prior jurisprudence. Consequently, we find that defendant should be sentenced according to the law that was in effect at the time he committed the offense.
Conclusion
For all the reasons expressed herein, we conclude that the punishment to be imposed on defendant, a habitual offender, is that provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it existed on the date he committed the underlying offense. We therefore reverse that portion of the court of appeal's judgment that vacated the habitual sentence imposed on defendant by the district court. However, because it determined that defendant's habitual offender sentence was improper, the court of appeal pretermitted consideration of defendant's second assignment of error contending the sentence imposed was unconstitutionally excessive. We therefore remand this case to the court of appeal for consideration of defendant's remaining assignment of error that was pretermitted on appeal.
Reversed and Remanded.
JOHNSON, Justice dissenting, assigns reasons.
The defendant, Danny Parker, is only one of hundreds of criminal defendants in Louisiana who have been convicted of drug offenses and sentenced as habitual offenders to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. In the instant case, Mr. Parker was tried and convicted of one count of possession of a Schedule III controlled dangerous substance, and one count of possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance. Due to his two previous convictions, he now faces a life sentence pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15: 529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. This result is not only draconian, but in my mind the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution have been violated by the excessiveness of this sentence in comparison to the crime for which he has been convicted.
Trial courts have the authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence provided by the multiple offender statute for a particular offense and offender, if the sentence would be constitutionally excessive. State v. Pollard, 93-0660 (La. 10/20/94), 644 So.2d 370. Further, this Court held in State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993), that if, in sentencing a defendant, the trial judge were to find that the punishment mandated by the habitual offender statute made no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounted to nothing more than purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and was grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, the trial judge would have the option, indeed the duty, to reduce such sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. Id. at 1280-81.
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