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Floyd v. Director of Revenue6/1/2004
Opinion Vote: REVERSED. Ahrens, P.J., Mooney, J., concur.
Opinion:
Cindy Floyd filed a petition for review of the revocation of her driving privileges by the Director of Revenue (Director). A prosecutor confessed judgment. Director filed a motion to set aside this judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Floyd's petition for review. Floyd appeals. We reverse.
On September 24, 2001, Floyd was involved in a traffic accident and taken to a hospital. Missouri Highway Patrol Corporal D.E. Caldwell investigated the accident and spoke to Floyd in the emergency room. The following is adduced from a narrative supplement completed by Corporal Caldwell describing what occurred at the hospital. Floyd "was very upset and asking for her daughter." Floyd became very uncooperative with the emergency staff and stated that she wanted to leave. Restraints were used to prevent Floyd from injuring herself. Corporal Caldwell told Floyd that she was under arrest for driving while intoxicated, advised Floyd of her Miranda rights and read Missouri's implied consent law to Floyd. Corporal Caldwell asked Floyd to take a chemical test of her blood and she refused.
The parties would later stipulate that Corporal Caldwell placed a notice that Floyd's driving privileges were being revoked in her purse.
On December 21, 2001, Floyd filed a petition for review of Director's revocation of her driving privileges. Floyd alleged, among other things, that she first learned of the revocation on November 26, 2001, when her attorney requested her driving record. An assistant prosecuting attorney for St. Charles County appeared for Director. On February 4, 2002, the prosecutor, "pursuant to plea agreement," confessed judgment on Floyd's petition for review. That same day Floyd pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated.
On February 13, 2002, Senior Counsel for Director entered an appearance. Two days later, Director filed a motion to set aside the February 4, 2002 judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Director alleged that the arresting officer gave Floyd notice of the revocation on September 24, 2001. Director further alleged that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Floyd's December 21, 2001 petition was filed more than thirty days after she received notice of the revocation. The motion provides that it was made "pursuant to Rule 75.01." Thereafter, the parties stipulated that Corporal Caldwell placed the notice of revocation of Floyd's driving privileges in her purse "while [Floyd] and her purse were in the hospital room." The parties also stipulated that Floyd's mental and physical condition was as described in Corporal Caldwell's narrative and that Floyd was not "lucid," or "clearly thinking."
On May 21, 2002, the trial court entered judgment granting Director's motion to set aside the February 4, 2002 judgment. The court also dismissed Floyd's petition for review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Floyd appeals, raising five points.
In her first point, Floyd argues that the trial court erred in granting Director's "Rule 75.01 motion" to set aside the February 4, 2002 judgment. Floyd emphasizes that Director's motion specifically invoked relief only under Rule 75.01 and no other "procedure." Rule 75.01 states in part that a "trial court retains jurisdiction over judgments during the thirty-day period after entry of judgment . . .." Floyd contends that under Rule 75.01 the court's jurisdiction expired thirty days after February 4, 2002, and therefore the judgment entered on May 21, 2002 was invalid.
The motion is titled "Motion to Set
Page 1 2 3 4 Missouri DUI Attorneys
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