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Willbanks v. Sugarloaf Cafe, Inc.1/23/2004
he will be deemed to have knowledge of that fact." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 814(2), 479 S.E.2d 401. "[A] construction of the Act **413 requiring actual knowledge would render the Act an ineffective sanction, since only when the defendant [has] admitted its own knowledge could the plaintiff prevail." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 814-815, 479 S.E.2d 401. Therefore, where there is any evidence from which to infer that the server should have known the visibly intoxicated person would be driving at some subsequent time after leaving, such evidence raises a jury issue as to the second prong of the Dram Shop Act.
While there was only slight evidence and reasonable inferences as to Buffalo's Café's knowledge of a visibly intoxicated person likely to drive soon after being served alcohol, slight evidence and reasonable inferences require the denial of summary judgment for jury *430 resolution of such issue in this case. [FN6] Since the evidence showed that both Dickens and Phillips were visibly intoxicated when Dickens drove away, then there exists a jury question as to whether Phillips' later driving was too remote for proximate causation. When there exists any evidence as to proof of an essential element of the cause of action, the trial court should not substitute his or her judgment on such evidentiary issue for the jury. [FN7]
FN6. Morrison v. J.H. Harvey Co., 256 Ga.App. 38, 40(2), 567 S.E.2d 370 (2002).
FN7. Artzner v. A&A Exterminators, 242 Ga.App. 766, 773(4), 531 S.E.2d 200 (2000).
Judgment reversed.
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