[T] People v. Ventura5/6/2004
ner in which the information was gathered, by providing such a detailed description of the suspect's criminal activity as to constitute self-verification. (See, also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-109, 85 S.Ct 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684). Again, the court concluded that the test had not been satisfied by the relatively innocuous activity revealed by the informer. The significance of Spinelli lies in its application of the Aguilar formula and the supplementation of both prongs by suggesting additional methods of satisfying them. Spinelli was followed by United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 20 L.Ed.2d 723, which carried the development one step further.
"Turning to New York law, we note a similarity of analysis. The veracity prong has been utilized in cases where the affidavit avers that the informant is credible because he had previously supplied accurate information (e.g. People v. Montague, 19 N.Y.2d 121, 278 N.Y.S.2d 372, 224 N.E.2d 873; People v. Rogers, 15 N.Y.2d 422, 260 N.Y.S.2d 433, 208 N.E.2d 168; or by an independent corroborative verification of the informer's tale, e.g., People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721, 191 N.E.2d 263, cert. den 376 U.S. 916, 84 S.Ct. 671, 11 L.Ed.2d 612; People v. Milinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 209 N.E.2d 694; People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417, 191 N.E.2d 798; People v. Alaimo, 34 N.Y.2d 187, 356 N.Y.S.2d 591, 313 N.E.2d 55). The basis of knowledge prong has been implemented in cases where the affidavit failed to aver the underlying circumstances (e.g. People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129, 303 N.Y.S.2d 33, 250 N.E.2d 323; People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337, 327 N.Y.S.2d 643, 277 N.E.2d 662; cert. den. Sub nom. Marcus v. New York, 409 U.S. 1027, 93 S.Ct. 460, 34 L.Ed.2d 321, and where the information was so detailed as to be self-verifying, e.g., People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457, 276 N.Y.S.2d 616, 223 N.E.2d 28). The key factor in these cases has been the presence of a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay statement.
"Where a search warrant has been secured, the bona fides of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case.
"The existence of probable cause is a determination solely for the Magistrate, not the affiant, and should only be made when probable cause has been demonstrated as a matter of fact in the manner prescribed by statute. (CPL art. 690) and decisional law (see, e.g., People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417, 191 N.E.2d 298, supra; People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186, 264 N.Y.S.2d 361, 211 N.E.2d 815). When considering whether probable cause exists no infallible formula is available; ideally we consider the probabilities as perceived by a reasonable, cautious and prudent police officer and evaluated by an independent Magistrate. However, in the real world, we are confronted with search warrant applications which are generally not composed by lawyers in the quiet of a law library but rather by law enforcement officers who are acting under stress and often within the context of a volatile situation. Consequently such search warrant applications should not be read in a hypertechnical manner as if they were entries in an essay contest. On the contrary, they must be considered in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable inferences. (See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879.)
"Therefore when the Magistrate undertakes this factual determination, he should consider all aspects of the information supporting the application. Of particular relevancy in this process is an evaluation of the sources of information an
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