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State v. Newman4/19/2004
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(ii)The state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or
(iii)Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; (C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense.
The district court granted the State's motion to continue the trial past the 180 days because a portion of the State's evidence was unavailable. In making that determination, the trial court concluded after a hearing that the prosecution exercised due diligence. We find nothing in the record warranting a different conclusion and hold the continuance was properly granted. Thus, the district court properly granted the State's motion to continue the trial. Thereafter, when the 180-day period came and went and Mr. Newman filed his motion to dismiss on the basis of a speedy trial violation, he had the burden of showing how the delay prejudiced him. Given that the trial was held within two weeks of the 180-day period, we are unable to find substantial prejudice. We hold that the original trial, which commenced on March 3, was timely and satisfies the time requirements of Rule 48. Newport, 983 P.2d at 1217. Any subsequent retrial was excluded from the requirements of the rule and under Rule 48 dismissal of the case with prejudice was not appropriate.
Generally, even when Rule 48 has not been violated, a speedy trial claim is subject to constitutional analysis, meaning the four-part test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) applies. Rodiak v. State, 2002 WY 137, 11, 55 P.3d 1, 11 (Wyo. 2002). This test requires us to balance 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. The ultimate question is whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair trial. Id. From the record before us, we hold dismissal with prejudice after the mistrial, on the basis of speedy trial concerns, was not warranted under the constitutional analysis. One hundred and ninety-nine days passed between Mr. Newman's arraignment and the date the district court granted the mistrial; most of that time was attributable to the court's crowded docket and the parties' efforts to reach a plea agreement; and no evidence was presented that delaying the trial to March 3 impaired Mr. Newman's right to a fair trial.
Given that the district court dismissed the case with prejudice and no new trial date was set, the issue of whether Mr. Newman's speedy trial rights would be violated by the delay between the order of dismissal and any second trial is not before us. In the event the State re-files charges against Mr. Newman upon issuance of the mandate from this Court following this appeal, the speedy trial issue could arise again. For purposes of resolving the issues raised on appeal, we hold only that no speedy trial violation had occurred up to the point when the district court granted the mistrial and dismissed the case with prejudice. The district court's conclusion that any second trial would necessarily violate Mr. Newman's right to speedy trial was premature.
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