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Rod v. State7/30/2004
Daniel Rod was convicted of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated in 2003. Because Rod had six prior convictions for this offense, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 360 days' imprisonment under AS 28.35.030(b)(1)(F). But Rod argued that five of his prior convictions were constitutionally invalid and that, for this reason, these five convictions should not be counted when determining his mandatory minimum sentence.
The district court held that, whatever the potential flaws in Rod's prior convictions, Rod had no right to attack those prior convictions in connection with his sentencing for his current o ffense. See Brockway v. State, 37 P.3d 427, 429-430 (Alaska App. 2001) (holding that a defendant generally has no right to collaterally attack prior convictions at the sentencing hearing for a new crime, even if the defendant's sentence for the new crime is being enhanced on account of those prior convictions). Rod now appeals the district court's ruling.
For the reasons explained here, we conclude that Rod failed to present any reason to doubt the constitutional validity of his prior convictions. Thus, regardless of whether Rod would have been entitled to attack his prior convictions if he had presented some evidence that these convictions were constitutionally invalid, the district court in this case could properly refuse to hear Rod's claims.
Rod's Argument
Rod argues that his DWI convictions from 1974 through 1980 are invalid because those prosecutions were brought under an unconstitutional statute. Relying on the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Crutchfield v. State, 627 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1980), Rod asserts that the version of the Alaska DWI statute that was in effect between 1974 and 1980 was unconstitutionally vague, at least in part. Rod further asserts that, because the written judgments in his five prior cases do not affirmatively specify that those prosecutions were not pursued under the unconstitutionally vague provision of the DWI law, we must now conclusively presume that those five prior convictions were premised on the unconstitutional part of the law.
To explain why we reject Rod's arguments, we must first examine the supreme court's decision in Crutchfield.
The Alaska Supreme Court's Decision in Crutchfield
In Crutchfield, our supreme court held that one clause of an administrative regulation implementing Alaska's DWI statute was unconstitutionally vague.
At the time that Crutchfield was litigated, Alaska's DWI statute forbade a person from operating a motor vehicle if they were "under the influence of intoxicating liquor, depressant, hallucinogenic or stimulant drugs or narcotic drugs as defined in AS 17.10.230(13) and AS 17.12.150(3)". The defendant in Crutchfield was prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle under the combined influence of alcohol and one of the depressant, hallucinogenic, or stimulant drugs codified in AS 17.12.150(3).
The first three paragraphs of AS 17.12.150(3) listed specific substances and chemicals that were declared to fall within the category of "depressant, hallucinogenic or stimulant" drugs. But the fourth paragraph of the statute, AS 17.12.150(3)(D), authorized the commissioner of health and social services to enact regulations expanding this category of regulated substances if the commissioner found that additional substances had a potential for abuse because of their depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic effect.
Exercising this authority, the commissioner enacted 7 AAC 32.010(b), a regulation that expanded the category of depressant, hallucinogenic, or stimulant drugs. Under this regulation, the list of controlled substances
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