State v. Moody8/8/2004
tor was subject to cross-examination sufficient to expose to the jury possible biases or flaws in his reasoning -- Moody has not met his burden of demonstrating that the false information "contribut to or significantly affect the verdict." King, 158 Ariz. at 424, 763 P.2d at 244. We therefore conclude that there was no fundamental error on this issue. D. The Competency Findings
Moody claims that the trial court deprived him of due process by failing to adjudicate him incompetent. He argues that the trial judge erred by privately reviewing unidentified portions of the record in determining that Moody was competent, failing to conduct a competency hearing until just before commencement of the trial, applying the wrong standard of competency, and finding him competent despite insufficient evidence to support such a finding. Consequently, Moody urges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and that his convictions must be reversed.
1. Unilateral Examination of Evidence
Moody alleges that the trial judge's review of the record on competency constituted an impermissible competency determination. However, the record contains no evidence that defense counsel ever objected to the trial judge's review of the record on competency. Consequently, Moody has waived this claim and we review only for fundamental error. See Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 297, 896 P.2d at 837.
Moreover, Moody appears to misperceive the record. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.5(a) and State v. Blier, 113 Ariz. 501, 503, 557 P.2d 1058, 1060 (1976), require that any competency hearing be open to the parties and guarantee the right of the defendant to be present. A competency hearing is required, however, only " f the court determines that reasonable grounds for an examination exist." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.3(a); accord State v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 315, 585 P.2d 1213, 1227 (1978); State v. De Vote, 87 Ariz. 179, 182, 349 P.2d 189, 192 (1960); State v. Reid, 87 Ariz. 123, 126, 348 P.2d 731, 733 (1960). In determining whether reasonable grounds exist, a judge may rely, among other factors, on his own observations of the defendant's demeanor and ability to answer questions. See State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 286, 670 P.2d 383, 391 (1983) (upholding a trial court's determination that a defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel based on psychiatric reports and the trial court's own observations). Further, if a defendant has already been adjudicated competent, the court must be permitted to rely on the record supporting that previous adjudication. State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 360-61, 542 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (holding that before granting a second competency hearing, "there must be some reasonable ground to justify another hearing on facts not previously presented to the trial court").
We presume that a court is aware of the relevant law and applies it correctly in arriving at its ruling. See State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 196, 914 P.2d 225, 229 (1996). With this presumption in mind, Moody's contention that the trial judge's pretrial review of the record on competency was an unlawful private "competency hearing" must be rejected. Rather, the record reflects that the trial judge's actions were consistent with his obligation under Rule 11.2 to seek "reasonable grounds" before ordering a subsequent competency evaluation. Each time the judge denied a defense motion for a competency hearing, he indicated that the proffered evidence gave him no reason to question Moody's competency, which had previously been determined. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the trial judge never expressly "found" Moody competent, as would be required aft
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