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Pietri v. State8/26/2004
tuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type.
Id.; see also Johnson v. Butterworth, 713 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla. 1998). Pietri has not cited any authority to support his claim that this letter written by a private attorney unconnected to the case to the family of the victim constitutes a public record that must be disclosed pursuant to chapter 119. Unquestionably, the letter was neither prepared by nor received by any state agency in connection with the preparation of Pietri's trial, appeal, or post-conviction action. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Pietri's motion to compel production of the letter. Pietri is not entitled to disclosure of the letter, and hence his claim here is denied.
Adoption of the State's Post-Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum
Pietri next asserts that by adopting the State's post-evidentiary hearing memorandum, the lower court abdicated any responsibility for independently making findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pietri's claim is without merit. In Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2001), we held that a trial court had not committed error by adopting the State's proposed order denying post-conviction relief. See id. at 248- 49. There, we wrote:
As to the issue of the adoption of the State's order, this Court has rejected similar challenges where the defendant had notice of the request for proposed orders and an opportunity to submit his or her own proposal and/or objections. See, e.g., Patton v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S749, S750-51, 2000 WL 1424526 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000); Groover v. State, 640 So. 2d 1077, 1078-79 (Fla. 1994). In Groover, for example, this Court held that the trial court's adoption of the State's proposed order denying a capital defendant relief on his 3.850 motion did not constitute a due process violation where the trial court signed the State's proposed order three days after defense counsel received a copy and the defendant had an opportunity to argue all of the issues in his brief and at a hearing. 640 So. 2d at 1079. The Court explained that even though the defendant did not have the ability to file his own proposed order, his ability to raise objections negated any due process concerns. See id.; see also Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100, 104 (Fla. 1994) (holding that verbatim adoption of State's proposed order on a capital defendant's 3.850 motion was not error because both parties stipulated to the filing of post-hearing memoranda, the State served its proposed order on defense counsel months before the trial court signed the State's order, and defense counsel filed an extensive response to the State's proposed order).
On the other hand, this Court has found a due process violation to exist when the defendant was not served with a copy of the State's proposed order or given an opportunity to file objections. See Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 1992); see also Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993). In contrast to Rose and Huff, in this case Glock's counsel had notice that the trial court asked the State to prepare a proposed order and Glock submitted objections to the State's proposed order.
Id. The judge in the instant action did not simply sign a proposed order written by the State. Instead, the judge authored his own one- page order in which he "incorporated by reference" the State's post- evidentiary hearing memorandum. The record reflects that at the end of the evidentiary hearing the judge requested that both parties file post- evidentiary hearing memoranda. Both parties agreed, without objection, to do so. The State filed its memorandum on July 5, 2002, well over a month before the trial court issued its order on August 27, 2002, denyi
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