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Gary v. State7/6/2004
ion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop.' [Cits.]" Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 423 (370 SE2d 784) (1988). Further, lthough an officer's honest belief that a traffic violation has actually been committed in his presence may ultimately prove to be incorrect, such a mistaken-but-honest belief may nevertheless demonstrate the existence of at least an articulable suspicion and reasonable grounds for the stop.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Webb, 193 Ga. App. 2, 4 (1) (386 SE2d 891) (1989). We reject Gary's argument that allowing Terry stops like this is somehow an adoption of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The good faith exception, recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 905 (I) (104 SC 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984), but rejected by our Supreme Court in Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 (422 SE2d 426) (1992), is concerned with searches authorized by defective warrants. Id. at 574. Here, of course, we are concerned with Terry stops, an entirely different Constitutional concept. Accordingly, Gary's enumerations of error challenging the roadblock and his initial stop by the deputy are without merit.
3. Gary's last enumeration of error contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the deputy had no articulable suspicion to detain him after the traffic stop and he had refused to consent to the search of his truck. We disagree. While it is true that a police officer can improperly expand the scope of an authorized stop to the point that a subsequent search and seizure would be unlawful, see Daniel v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (Appeal No. S03G1172, decided May 24, 2004), this is not such a case.
Daniel v. State recognized that although n investigative detention usually must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification, ... it does not automatically follow that any further detention for questioning is unconstitutional." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at __. Thus, continued questioning by law enforcement officers is authorized "when either the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity or when the valid traffic stop has de-escalated into a consensual encounter." Id. at __.
In this case, we find that the deputy had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Gary might be in possession of drugs to warrant further detention and questioning.
The deputy knew that reports had been received that Gary was the source of drugs in the area, that Gary engaged in evasive tactics to avoid the roadblock, that Gary was extremely nervous, and that during the questioning legitimately associated with the traffic stop, Gary had acted in a manner which according to the deputy's training and experience indicated that drugs might be in the tow truck.
Given this information, the trial court did not err by concluding that the deputy was authorized to detain Gary for further investigation. " police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Gary's motion to suppress on this basis.
Judgment affirmed. Mikell, J., concurs and Blackburn, P. J., concurs in judgment only.
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