Stockman v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies9/30/2004
Hampshire.
September 15, 2003.
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Revocation of license to operate. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence, Homicide. Homicide.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 19, 2000.
The case was heard by Bertha D. Josephson, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The plaintiff, Ty Stockman, was convicted in 1990 of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). Subsequently he was prosecuted for an accident that occurred in February, 1992, wherein one Shannon Parker was killed. In that prosecution, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of involuntary manslaughter and of motor vehicle homicide, G. L. c. 90, § 24G(a), an offense that includes as an element a finding of driving while intoxicated. Following the procedure mandated by Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 392-395 (1981), the trial judge dismissed the charge of motor vehicle homicide as duplicative for double jeopardy purposes, and sentenced Stockman on the manslaughter conviction. Noting that a consequence of the Jones procedure was to leave standing only a conviction (i.e., manslaughter) that on its face did not suggest the death was caused by Stockman's drunk driving , the judge, cognizant that drunk driving convictions are the predicate for license revocations under G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(c)(4), placed on the record the following notation:
"In imposing sentence on only the involuntary manslaughter conviction, this court did not mean to preclude any appropriate license suspension sanctions for a motor vehicle fatality. This court therefore states that any licence suspension sanctions that would result from a conviction [under] chapter 90, section 24G, motor vehicle homicide statute, should apply to this defendant, who in fact was convicted [under] both the . . . motor vehicle homicide statute and the involuntary manslaughter statute."
Upon receiving the court abstract, the registrar of motor vehicles suspended Stockman's license for ten years pursuant to § 24G(c). When the registrar later discovered Stockman's prior conviction of driving while intoxicated in 1990, the registrar, acting in accordance with his understanding of G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(c)(4), revoked for life Stockman's license to operate. On appeal, the defendant board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds (board) upheld the suspension, as did the judge who reviewed the board's decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. Both decisions are, in our view, correct.
Stockman's initial contention stems from the elusive wording of § 24(1)(c)(4), inserted by St. 1982, c. 373, § 4, which instructs the registrar as follows:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing, no new license shall be issued or right to operate be reinstated by the registrar to any person convicted of a violation of subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) until ten years after the date of conviction in case the registrar determines upon investigation and after hearing that the action of the person so convicted in committing such offense caused an accident resulting in the death of another, nor at any time after a subsequent conviction of such an offense, whenever committed, in case the registrar determines in the manner aforesaid that the action of such person, in committing the offense of which he was so subsequently convicted, caused an accident resulting in the death of another" (emphasis added).
Stockman argues that the emphasized language requires, for a lifetime revocation, two separate accidents, each caused by the defendant's intoxicated driving, each resulting in a person's death. The correct reading, in ou
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