Estate of Betty Jean Shinholster v. Annapolis Hospital7/30/2004
d by the Court of Appeals, these "reference to 'plaintiff' not . . . reference to a personal representative [or an estate] in a wrongful death case, because [neither] would . . . be the one evaluated for comparative negligence; instead, the decedent would be so evaluated." Shinholster, supra at 357. We agree with the trial court and hold that, for purposes of § 6311, the term "plaintiff" refers to the decedent, Mrs. Shinholster.
However, our inquiry into the application of § 6311 in the instant case does not stop there. Rather, § 6311 states that it applies if the plaintiff is "60 years of age or older at the time of judgment." (Emphasis added.) Because the term "plaintiff" refers to the decedent in a wrongful death action, and because Shinholster was sixty-one at her death and at the time of judgment, we agree with the trial court's interpretation of § 6311, and hold that, on remand, the trial court cannot reduce any future damages awarded to plaintiff to their present value.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because § 6304(1) requires, without exception, that a trier of fact be permitted in all "personal injury, property damage, wrongful death" tort actions to consider the conduct of all parties whose conduct has constituted a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages, and because, on the basis of the evidence presented by defendants, reasonable minds could find that plaintiff's pre-treatment negligence here constituted "a proximate cause"-a foreseeable, natural and probable consequence-of her fatal stroke, we remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the opinions of this Court. Further, based on our decision in Jenkins, where we held that the medical malpractice non-economic damages cap of § 1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice, we affirm the decisions of both lower courts and hold that the higher cap of § 1483 applies when the injured person, at any time while still living and as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, fits within the ambit of § 1483 (1)(a),
(b), or (c). Finally, because the term "plaintiff," as used in § 6311, refers, for purposes of a wrongful death action, to the decedent, and because Mrs. Shinholster, the decedent, was sixty-one at her death and at the time of judgment, we agree with the trial court's interpretation of § 6311, and hold that the trial court cannot reduce any future damages award to plaintiff to their present value.
Stephen J. Markman
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and YOUNG, JJ.
We join in section III(A) and with the determination in section III(B) that the medical malpractice cap of § 1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice.
Maura D. Corrigan, Clifford W. Taylor, Robert P. Young, Jr.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.
We join in section III(C) and concur in the result only with regard to section III(B).
Michael F. Cavanagh, Marilyn Kelly.
WEAVER, J.
I join in sections III(B) and III(C).
Elizabeth A. Weaver
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
Although I agree fully with the majority analysis, I write separately to elaborate on my views concerning § II(A)(1) of the opinion.
I. PREVIOUS JURISPRUDENCE
Not only does the clear language of MCL 600.6304 support the majority interpretation, but I believe that this interpretation is consistent with this Court's previous jurisprudence concerning an original tortfeasor's liability in light of subsequent medical malpractice. In the context of medical malpractice, it has long been held that ne
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