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State v. Labuda8/10/2004
tand Labuda's answers. Deputy Dwyer asked Labuda several questions without first giving him a Miranda warning. Ultimately, Deputy Dwyer concluded that Labuda had been driving under the influence. Another patrol officer then removed Labuda from the minivan and took Labuda into custody.
Labuda moved to suppress the statements he made to Deputy Dwyer, which the District Court denied. Ultimately, Labuda pled guilty to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, second offense, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Labuda now appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the district court's conclusions of law were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Henderson , 1998 MT 233, 9, 291 Mont. 77, 9, 966 P.2d 137, 9. A district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence; if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence; or if a mistake has been committed. Henderson , 9.
DISCUSSION
Did the officers have particularized suspicion in stopping the minivan in which Labuda was a passenger?
Labuda argues that " here is no record that either of the deputies were provided with any identification of the suspect by Giles before or during the time of the stop of the van." In addition, Labuda argues that " he only, on record, connection between the van and the suspected pickup . . . was that it [the minivan] was coming from the general direction of where the pickup was seen in a stopped position." Such information, Labuda contends, does not constitute objective data connecting the minivan to the driver of the pickup. Hence, the stop of the minivan was illegal, and any evidence derived from the stop must be suppressed.
The State of Montana (the State) argues that "substantial evidence" connected Labuda to the events that Giles witnessed. Specifically, the State argues that: (1) Giles followed the pickup and saw it pull into a residence; (2) Giles never lost sight of the pickup and watched the driver go to and from the pickup into the residence; and (3) Giles testified that he believed the driver of the pickup was the same person in the minivan whom the officers stopped. Hence, the State argues that "there was adequate evidence from which the district court" could make the inference that Labuda--the passenger in the minivan--was also the erratic driver of the pickup.
Under § 46-5-401(1), MCA, "a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." The existence of particularized suspicion is a question of fact, which a district court determines in light of the totality of circumstances. State v. Lacasella , 2002 MT 326, 20, 313 Mont. 185, 20, 60 P.3d 975, 20. Particularized suspicion exists if: (1) an officer has objective data from which to make certain inferences; and (2) the officer also has a suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing. Lacasella , 20.
We adopted a three factor test in State v. Pratt (1997), 286 Mont. 156, 165, 951 P.2d 37, 42-43, to evaluate the totality of the circumstances under which an investigative stop is made pursuant to a tip. These factors include whether: (1) the informant remains anonymous or subjects himself to civil and crimina
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