State v. Labuda8/10/2004
l liability; (2) the report is based on personal observations; and (3) the officer's own observations corroborate the informant's information. State v. Hall , 2004 MT 106, 9, 321 Mont. 78, 9, 88 P.3d 1273, 9.
In addition, we held in State v. Elison , 2000 MT 288, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456, that the officer had particularized suspicion to stop Elison based on "Gibson's [the nonanonymous informant's] report . . . [regarding] his personal observation of Elison smoking from a brass pipe, appearing startled upon noticing the patrol car and attempting to hide the pipe from view; Officer Conrad's corroboration of Gibson's description of the vehicle; and Officer Conrad's independent observation of Elison's subsequent driving behavior which appeared suspicious in light of Gibson's report." Elison , 22, 23. We held that " hese facts re reliable objective data from which Officer Conrad could make certain inferences, based on his [Officer Conrad's] four years of experience and training, which would lead to a resulting suspicion that Elison was engaged in wrongdoing." Elison , 22.
In Elison , the officer was informed by the non-anonymous informant that he observed Elison "smoking from what he believed to be a marijuana pipe and that . . . [Elison] . . . appeared startled and attempted to hide the pipe." Elison , 7. The officer in Elison did not witness any of the activity that the non-anonymous informant had, but the officer did locate the truck that Elison was driving. Elison , 7. At that point, the officer stopped Elison's vehicle and "immediately smell the odor of marijuana," and noticed that "Elison appeared nervous, his eyes were red and glassy, and he would not sit still." Elison , 8.
Here, just as in Elison , the non-anonymous informant, Giles, observed Labuda's erratic driving, followed Labuda to a residence, and observed Labuda exit his pickup, go to and from his residence, and get into a minivan that arrived some time later. Giles relayed his observations to Deputy Dwyer, upon Deputy Dwyer's arrival near the residence. Deputy Dwyer then observed the minivan pass by him, and was advised by Deputy Ross that Labuda was in the passenger side. At that point, Deputy Dwyer stopped the minivan, and subsequently noted that Labuda had difficulty in answering the questions asked of him and that Labuda noticeably slurred his words.
Just as we held in Elison , Deputy Dwyer's corroboration met the third factor of the Pratt test. And, ultimately, all three factors of the Pratt test were established, and Deputy Dwyer had particularized suspicion to justify his stop of Labuda.
There was an unbroken chain of events and observations starting with Giles's observations of Labuda driving on the wrong side of the road, to Giles's observations of Labuda's pickup "drifting from one lane to the other," to Giles's observations of another vehicle having to get onto the shoulder of the road to facilitate Labuda's passing, to Giles's following of Labuda's pickup, to Giles's observations of Labuda driving to a residence, wherein Labuda went to and from the residence and his pickup, to Giles's observations of the minivan arrival and Giles entering the minivan on the passenger side, to Giles's statements to Deputy Dwyer and Deputy Ross of his observations, to Deputy Dwyer's stop of the minivan and Deputy Dwyer's personal observations of Labuda's state of apparent intoxication following the stop. All three parts of the the Pratt test were satisfied. Hence, particularized suspicion existed upon which Deputy Dwyer had objective data and a resulting suspicion that Labuda was driving under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, we hold that the District Court did not er
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