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State v. Barnhill9/7/2004
idence, `a trial court's conclusions of law regarding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion [or probable cause] to detain a defendant is reviewable de novo."'" State v. Wilson, 155 N.C. App. 89, 93-94, 574 S.E.2d 93, 97 (2002) (citations omitted) (alteration in original), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 157 L.Ed. 2d 78 (2003). Furthermore, the trial court's conclusions of law "`must be legally correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.'" Barden, 356 N.C. at 332, 572 S.E.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court's conclusions of law reflect an incorrect application of legal principles to the facts found. In the trial court's conclusion of law it stated:
3. Any and all evidence obtained by the police as a result of the vehicle stop should be suppressed because the seizure of Mr. Barnhill's vehicle was an unreasonable investigatory stop and not justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion so as to yield a substantial possibility that criminal conduct had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur. State v. Battle, 109 N.C. App. 367(1993) (emphasis in original). The trial court applied the "reasonable and articulable suspicion" standard to determine whether the stop of defendant's vehicle was justified. "While there are instances in which a traffic stop is also an investigatory stop, warranting the use of the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, the two are not always synonymous." Wilson, 155 N.C. App. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 97. Where an officer makes a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation, such as speeding or running a red light, such a stop will be valid if it was supported by probable cause. Id. See also State v. Reynolds, 161 N.C. App. 144, 147, 587 S.E.2d 456, 458 (2003). The standard the trial court applied, the reasonable suspicion standard, does not apply here, as the basis for the stop was speeding, a readily observed traffic violation.
Thus, we apply the probable cause standard to the facts of this case to determine if Officer Malone had sufficient justification to stop defendant's vehicle. "Probable cause is `a suspicion produced by such facts as indicate a fair probability that the person seized has engaged in or is engaged in criminal activity.'" Wilson, 155 N.C. App. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 97-98 (citations omitted). Officer Malone testified at the suppression hearing that he believed defendant to be speeding based on his personal observation of the speed of the vehicle, the racing of the engine, and the bouncing of the car through the intersection.
The trial court concluded, in what was designated as finding of fact No. 13, that " n the absence of any objective facts, or specific training in speed estimation the Officer's opinion that the vehicle was traveling 40 m.p.h. is subjective and therefore immaterial and did not give the Officer legal justification to stop the Defendant's vehicle." The court also made the following findings regarding Officer Malone:
12(d). He could not provide any objective facts as to corroborate his opinion as to his opined distance or time.
12(g). He could not articulate any objective criteria on which to base his opinion of the vehicle's speed;
The order of the trial court would have the effect of preventing an officer from stopping a vehicle based solely upon the officer's observations, in the absence of some additional "objective facts" or "objective criteria" which supported the officer's opinion based upon his or her personal observations. This is contrary to the established case law and the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence
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