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State v. Satterfield9/7/2004
since the State does not repeat this argument on appeal, we do not reach the issue and instead assume, for the purposes of this appeal, that there was a stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Under the Fourth Amendment, before a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle without a warrant, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be occurring. State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 212, 582 S.E.2d 371, 374 (2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)). " easonable suspicion" requires that " he stop must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). There must be a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an 'unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" Id. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L.Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). This Court reviews de novo the trial court's conclusion of law that a reasonable, articulablesuspicion existed to justify a stop.
Here, the trial court found that the trooper stopped defendant to inquire why defendant was not following the directions of the Highway Patrol regarding exiting the Speedway. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-114.1(a) (2003) provides:
No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic.
Based on the trial court's findings of fact, the trooper had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating this statute. The officer's stop of defendant was, therefore, lawful under the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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