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Crawford v. State10/22/2004
rlier] unwarned confession. ... (" 'Trice, didn't you tell me that [the boy] was supposed to die in his sleep?"); cf. Elstad, supra, at 316 ... (officers did not "exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into waiving his right to remain silent"). Such a tactic may bear on the voluntariness inquiry.
Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2619-2620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
We now return to the facts of the interrogation in the present case. Analyzing those facts under the federal constitutional law that we have just described, we conclude that we must suppress Crawford's post-Miranda re-affirmation that there was cocaine under the seat of his car.
Crawford does not challenge the content of the Miranda warnings that he received from Lindell. Thus, we begin with the presumption that Lindell's administration of Miranda warnings to Crawford adequately apprised Crawford of his rights to remain silent and to consult an attorney before deciding whether to answer police questions. Moreover, under Elstad, we must presume that these Miranda warnings dissipated the adverse psychological effects that normally attend a custodial interrogation, and we must further presume that these Miranda warnings insulated Crawford from the psychological pressures potentially exerted by his earlier unwarned admissions. Nevertheless, we find that the facts of Crawford's case rebut these presumptions.
As explained earlier in this opinion, Lindell arrested Crawford for driving with a revoked license. Following this formal arrest, with Crawford in handcuffs, Lindell searched Crawford's pockets and found a small pipe that smelled of marijuana. Upon discovering the pipe, Lindell asked Crawford if he had anything else in his pockets; Crawford admitted that he had a small can of marijuana, and Lindell retrieved this marijuana from Crawford's pocket. Lindell then questioned Crawford about the contents of Crawford's vehicle; he asked Crawford if there were any more drugs in the car. At this point, Crawford admitted that there was cocaine under the seat. That is, Crawford admitted that he was guilty of a felony.
Upon hearing this, Lindell took Crawford to the patrol car and, for the first time, advised Crawford of his Miranda rights. Crawford waived his Miranda rights and agreed to further questioning.
Lindell began this post-Miranda questioning by immediately reminding Crawford that he had just confessed to possessing cocaine under the seat of his car.
(Lindell said to Crawford, "Like we were talking about before, you had said you had coke under the seat.") Lindell then questioned Crawford further about the cocaine.
Viewing the facts objectively, from the perspective of a person in Crawford's position, Crawford was subjected to a continuing interrogation about his possession of cocaine, with Miranda warnings inserted midstream, with barely an interruption, and after Crawford had already confessed to this crime. Employing the analysis adopted by the plurality in Seibert, we conclude that this midstream administration of Miranda warnings did not effectively apprise Crawford of "the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them". Rather, in these circumstances, when Crawford heard the Miranda warning that any statements he made could be used against him, Crawford could reasonably conclude that his earlier unwarned admissions would be used against him - thus removing any incentive for Crawford to invoke his right to silence when Lindell immediately asked Crawford to re-affirm those admissions.
(Compare Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981), where our supreme court acknowledged that Miranda warnings can be misleading in an
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