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People v. Yascavage11/30/2004
ering with a witness or victim. Yascavage was sentenced to two years imprisonment on the tampering count, to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed on the other counts.
Yascavage appealed each of his convictions. With respect to his tampering conviction, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because the prosecution presented no evidence to the jury that Collier had been "legally summoned" as required by section 18-8-707.
In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed, vacating the tampering conviction and holding that neither the mere presence of the victim at trial nor the information listing Collier as a potential witness would permit the jury to conclude that she was legally summoned.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the tampering statute requires proof that the witness or victim was legally summoned to an official proceeding and whether the general assembly intended "legally summoned" in the context of the tampering statute, to mean "subject to legal process." We now hold that section 18-8-707 does require that the victim or witness be legally summoned when the defendant is prosecuted under section 18-8-707(1)(b) and that the general assembly intended "legally summoned" in that subsection to mean that the witness have some obligation to the court to appear.
II. Analysis
A. History of the Tampering Statute
In 1963, the Colorado legislature defined a new crime of tampering. See § 40-8-605, C.R.S. (1963) (1971 Perm. Cum. Supp.). The purpose of the crime was to punish any attempt to induce another to testify falsely or otherwise to subvert the administration of justice. People v. Moyer, 670 P.2d 785, 791 (Colo. 1983); Model Penal Code § 241.6 cmt 1. Subsequently, the tampering statute became part of Title Eighteen. § 18-6-605, (1973) (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Most recently, the legislature repealed and re-enacted the tampering statute as part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1984. See ch. 122 sec. 4, § 18-8-701, 1984 Colo. Sess. Laws 499, 502. The language of the tampering statute remained largely unchanged through this period of time. Accordingly, comments following the adoption of section 40-8-605 and cases construing section 18-8-605 are relevant in interpreting the modern provision.
Colorado's tampering statute was modeled after Michigan proposal section 5020, which was in turn derived from the Model Penal Code section 241.6. See § 40-8-605 cmt. The drafters of the Model Penal Code sought to deter conduct that would affect the integrity of the criminal justice system by protecting against those who would seek to undermine the veracity and cooperation of witnesses and informants. MPC § 241.6 cmt. 1. Section 241.6 of the Model Penal Code dealt with tampering, retaliation, and bribery of witnesses and informants. The Michigan code dealt with intimidation, bribery, coercion or threats against witnesses separately from tampering. Michigan Code §§ 5005, 5015. Section 5020 was intended to apply to the "less sinister means" of impeding the administration of justice through improper contact with witnesses; such as use of general argument or pleading to persuade a prospective witness to withhold information on the stand or disobey a subpoena. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 5020 cmt. Both model laws focused on the defendant's subjective intent to subvert the administration of justice by improperly inducing a person to refrain from cooperating with the authorities. We interpret section 18-8-707 against that historical backdrop.
B. Statutory Interpretation
In construing a statute, our goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the le
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