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Commonwealth v. Shuck10/22/2004
2003, the Fayette Circuit Court entered an opinion and order reversing the district court and holding that a cracked windshield is not prohibited under Kentucky law, that a cracked windshield does not constitute an offense, and that, therefore, the police stop by Officer Wilson was illegal. The circuit court ordered the fruits of the stop suppressed. We subsequently accepted discretionary review.
The Commonwealth contends that the circuit court erred in its determination that the stop of Shuck's vehicle by Officer Wilson was illegal. The Commonwealth argues that Officer Wilson properly stopped Shuck for a vehicle safety violation. Because the underpinning of the circuit court's decision is that driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield is not a violation of Kentucky law, we first address this issue.
Sergeant Wilson originally charged Shuck with violating KRS 189.110, which contains various provisions relating to obstruction of windshield visibility. However, since the filing of the suppression motion, the Commonwealth has primarily defended the stop on the basis that the cracked windshield was a violation of KRS 189.020 rather than KRS 189.110. The Commonwealth now concedes, and we agree, that KRS 189.110 does not apply to situations involving a cracked windshield. KRS 189.110 is plainly concerned with other types of windshield visibility obstructions. We will accordingly limit our review to the statute relied upon by the Commonwealth in defense of the stop, KRS 189.020.
KRS 189.020 is captioned "Equipment of vehicle not to be nuisance or menace." The statute provides as follows:
Every vehicle when on a highway shall be so equipped as to make a minimum of noise, smoke or other nuisance, to protect the rights of other traffic, and to promote the public safety.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Interim Office of Health Planning and Certification v. Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Services, Inc., Ky. App., 932 S.W.2d 388, 390 (1996). When analyzing a statute, we must interpret statutory language with regard to its common and approved usage. KRS 446.080(4). Statutory language must be accorded its literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable result. Coy v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co., Ky. App., 920 S.W.2d 73, 74 (1995). Where there are no exceptions provided by the legislature, it is presumed that none were intended. Tilley v. Tilley, Ky. App., 947 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1997). In its opinion and order holding that a cracked windshield is not prohibited under KRS 189.020, the circuit court focused exclusively on the "nuisance" clause of the statute. The circuit court referenced the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "nuisance" and concluded:
KRS § 189.020 indicates that violations thereof may result from "noise, smoke, or other nuisance" giving some indication that the statute uses a meaning of the term nuisance similar to that set out in Black's Law Dictionary, supra. The term is not otherwise defined in KRS hapter 189. From its understanding of the term nuisance and the traditional usage indicated in Black's Law Dictionary, this Court cannot find that a cracked windshield is a nuisance for purposes of KRS § 189.020. Furthermore, given the generality of this statute and the specificity in KRS § 189.110, this Court finds that the legislature could have easily made provisions for cracked windshields in the statute entitled "Unobstructed windshields" and will not enlarge the provisions of KRS § 189.020 to encompass cracked windshields.
The requirement that every vehicl
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