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Commonwealth v. Shuck10/22/2004
e be equipped so as to make "a minimum of noise, smoke or other nuisance," is addressed in only the first of the three clauses contained in KRS 189.020. We agree with the circuit court that the cracked windshield in this case does not violate the "nuisance" clause of the statute. However, the statute also requires every vehicle be equipped so as "to protect the rights of other traffic" and to be equipped so as "to promote the public safety." A statute should be construed, if possible, so that no part of it is meaningless and ineffectual. Hardin County Fiscal Court v. Hardin County Bd. of Health, Ky. App., 899 S.W.2d 859, 861-862 (1995). We conclude that the circuit court erred by failing to give meaning and effect to the latter two clauses of the statute.
We also note that the circuit court interpreted KRS 189.110 as prevailing over KRS 189.020 on the basis KRS 189.110 was the more specific statute and "that the legislature could have easily made provisions for cracked windshields in the statute entitled 'unobstructed windshields' [KRS 189.110]." True enough, " here two statutes concern the same or similar subject matter, the specific shall prevail over the general." Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (1997). However, " t is an established rule of statutory construction that seemingly conflicting statutes are to be construed so as to give meaning to both." Hopkinsville-Christian County Planning Com'n v. Christian County Bd. of Educ., Ky. App., 903 S.W.2d 531, 532 (1995). KRS 189.110 does not purport to codify all laws relating to windshield safety. Further, the two statutes do not contradict one another and are not, in fact, in conflict. We accordingly conclude that the rule that the specific prevails over the general is not applicable in this case.
In addition, the circuit court appears to have misconstrued the significance of the caption to KRS 189.110. The caption "unobstructed windshields" is merely the caption to the statute as prepared by the statute reviser, Arciero v. Hager, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 50, 53 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Hicks v. Enlow, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 68 (1989), and does not constitute any part of the law. KRS 446.140.
In summary, we conclude that KRS 189.110 does not hamper the application of KRS 189.020 to a cracked windshield. Upon application of the plain language of KRS 189.020 and our interpretation of the legislative intent in its enactment, we conclude that a windshield which is cracked or damaged to the extent that it unreasonably impairs the vision of the driver violates those provisions of KRS 189.020 requiring that a vehicle be equipped so as to protect the rights of other traffic and to promote the public safety.
If a cracked windshield is of sufficient severity so as to obstruct the vision of the driver, the resulting diminished observational capacity necessarily increases the risk that the driver will have a reduced ability to observe other traffic, which, it follows, increases the likelihood of the vehicle being involved in a collision. As such, a vehicle equipped with a cracked windshield which unreasonably diminishes the viewing ability of the driver is not a vehicle equipped to protect the rights of other traffic. Moreover, because of the increased risk of collision, a vehicle equipped with a cracked windshield which unreasonably interferes with the viewing ability of the driver does not promote the public safety.
On the other hand, a cracked windshield is not, per se, a violation of KRS 189.020. A violation occurs only if the crack is of sufficient gravity to unreasonably obscure the driver's visibility so as to result in a threat to the rights of other traffic or to public safety. De minim
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