Commonwealth v. Shuck10/22/2004
is "hairline" cracks which do not impair visibility do not threaten the rights of other traffic or pose a threat to public safety. Given the unlimited range of possible situations which may arise, it will be necessary for individual instances to be evaluated on a case by-case basis.
Having concluded that a cracked windshield may result in a violation of KRS 189.020, we now turn to the legality of Officer Wilson's June 17, 2001, stop of Shuck. A traffic stop is a limited seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979). A warrantless search and/or seizure is presumed to be both unreasonable and unlawful, and the prosecution has the burden of proving the warrantless search and/or seizure was justifiable under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Gallman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 578 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1979); Gray v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 28 S.W.3d 316, 318 (2000).
An investigative stop is a common exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may stop an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court held that an officer may stop an automobile under the Terry stop exception if the officer possesses the requisite reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed. 2d 89 (1996); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1116 (1976); and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed. 2d 607 (1975).
In its November 1, 2001, opinion and order, the district court made a finding that "the pictures provided by Shuck present evidence of a significant crack in the front windshield that may impair the vision of the driver or effect the likelihood of the shattering of the windshield in the event there is a striking of the windshield from debris or otherwise while being operated on the highway."
The Kentucky rule governing suppression of evidence is RCr 9.78. Under this rule, upon a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings. The trial court's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Watkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 105 S.W.3d 449, 451 (2003). When the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, the question then becomes whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is violated. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (2002). The test for substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone, or in the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men. Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, Ky. App., 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 811, 121 S.Ct. 32, 148 L.Ed. 2d 13 (2000).
The record includes numerous pictures from multiple angles of the cracked windshield. The crack originates on the passenger side of the vehicle and at that point resembles two large asterisks, one situated toward the upper corner and the other at approximately a normally-seated passenger's eye-level position. From there, two primary fissures snake toward the driver's side directly across what would be a normally-seated driver's view. The fissures, while lengthy, are near-hairline. Pictures taken from inside
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