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State v. James10/19/2004
impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 is eligible for a limited driving privilege if:
a. At the time of the offense he held either a valid driver's license or a license that hadbeen expired for less than one year;
b. At the time of the offense he had not within the preceding seven years been convicted of an offense involving impaired driving;
c. Punishment Level Three, Four, or Five was imposed for the offense of impaired driving;
d. Subsequent to the offense he has not been convicted of, or had an unresolved charge lodged against him for, an offense involving impaired driving; and
e. The person has obtained and filed with the court a substance abuse assessment of the type required by G.S. 20-17.6 for the restoration of a drivers license. (2003).
Our review of the record on appeal reveals that defendant was not eligible for a limited driving privilege because at the time of trial defendant had not "obtained and filed with the court a substance abuse assessment of the type required by G.S. 20-17.6 for the restoration of a drivers license" as required by § 20-179.3(b)(1)e. Because defendant was not eligible for a limited driving privilege, we conclude that he was not entitled to the opportunity to show just cause. For this reason we hold that the trial court did not err by denying defendant limited driving privileges. Defendant also argues that the trial court violated a statutory mandate by ordering defendant not to use, possess or consume alcohol. We disagree.
General Statutes section 15A-1343(b1)(10) provides that " n addition to the regular conditions of probation specified in subsection (b), the court may, as a condition of probation, require that during the probation the defendant . . . atisfy any other conditions determined by the court to be reasonably related to his rehabilitation." (2003).
The trial court's order that defendant not use, possess or consume alcohol is reasonably related to defendant's rehabilitation in that it prohibits defendant from engaging in conduct that could reasonably lead to further alcohol-related offenses. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's order violates no statutory mandate. Defendant's assertion that his issues were properly preserved for appeal is overruled and the appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed.
Judges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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