Daniels v. Carpenter1/28/2003
bility unless the defendant parents/homeowners provided the alcohol to the minor guests or, at least, they knew or should have known alcohol was being provided to the minor guest. Second, there is no liability unless the parents/homeowners knew or should have known that the minor guest was drinking to the point of intoxication. And third, there is no liability unless the parents/homeowners knew or should have known that the minor guest would soon be driving an automobile. In other words, the mere failure of parents/homeowners to supervise the minors does not, without more, create a duty to protect third parties from harm caused by an intoxicated minor driver under these circumstances. *fn15 See Sutter, 327 S.E.2d at 719; Charles v. Seigfried, 251 Ill.App.3d 1059, 191 Ill.Dec. 431, 623 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1993), rev'd, 165 Ill.2d 482, 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1995) (reversed on ground that state's dramshop act had pre-empted the field); Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 378; Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind.App. 1989); Fullmer v. Tague, 500 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1993); Spears v. Bradford, 652 So.2d 628, 632 (La.App. 1995); O'Flynn v. Powers, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 936, 646 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 (1995); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992); Daniel v. Reeder, 16 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tex.App. 2000); and Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Social Host's Liability for Injuries Incurred by Third Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4 th 16, §§ 8-9, 13, 17-19 (1988).
[ ] It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to dismiss the appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint failed to allege the minimal facts that would support a cause of action under these circumstances. Perhaps the most noticeable deficiency is any allegation that the appellees knew or should have known that Jefferson would soon be driving a car. Nowhere in the record is there even a suggestion, let alone any evidence, to contradict the complaint's own implication that the boys left the appellees' premises on foot. Consequently, there is likewise nothing in the record to support any inference that the appellees knew or should have known that Jefferson would later be driving a vehicle. Similarly, there is not a hint in the complaint as to the source of the alcohol that Jefferson drank that night. An allegation of failure to supervise minors, without more, is not sufficient.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
[ ] W.R.C.P. 15(a) provides, in pertinent part:
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. (Emphasis added.)
The decision whether to allow a pleading to be amended is left to the sound discretion of the district court and is subject to reversal only for an abuse of that discretion. Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 459 (Wyo. 1978). "Judicial discretion is 'a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'" Herbel v. S.K. Wood Co., 897 P.2d 478, 480 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). The basic guideline for the exercise of discretion in ruling on a W.R.C.P.
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