 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Busby v. State2/1/2002
ly had to prove that a reasonable person in Busby's position would have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that Busby's license was revoked, and that Busby's failure to perceive this risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in those circumstances.
But this is all beside the point. Busby admittedly knew that the State of Alaska had revoked his driver's license. That license revocation was what prompted Busby to research the law concerning international driving permits and the United Nations Convention on Road Traffic. Rather than claiming ignorance of his license revocation, Busby wanted to tell the jury about his understanding of the legal effect of that revocation. He wished to testify that, based on his legal research, he believed that his international driving permit entitled him to drive in Alaska despite the fact that his license was revoked.
AS 11.81.620 declares that a defendant's "knowledge, recklessness, or criminal negligence as to the ... meaning ... or application of the provision of law defining an offense ... is not an element of offense unless the provision of law clearly so provides." AS 28.15.291(a), the statute defining the crime of driving with a suspended or revoked license, does not specify that the government must prove anything about the defendant's subjective understanding of the effect or scope of the license suspension or revocation. Instead, the government must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the suspension or revocation had occurred. Therefore, it was irrelevant whether Busby had researched the Convention on Road Traffic, and it was likewise irrelevant whether Busby had mistakenly concluded, based on this research, that his international driving permit authorized him to drive in Alaska despite the fact that his Alaska license was revoked.
We recognize that Busby's trial judge ruled that Busby had a right to testify about these matters (although, as explained above, she limited the scope of Busby's testimony). The trial judge relied on our decision in Cornwall v. State, 915 P.2d 640 (Alaska App. 1996). But Cornwall involved a prosecution for custodial interference , an offense that expressly requires proof that the defendant took or kept a child knowing that the defendant had no right to do so.
In Cornwall, the question was whether the trial judge should have allowed the defendant to present testimony concerning the defendant's mistaken understanding of certain child custody orders. We explained that this testimony was admissible because it was relevant to the issue of the defendant's state of mind - and because one of the elements of custodial interference is the defendant's state of mind. But we noted that this same testimony would not have been admissible if it "had been offered for the purpose of convincing the jury that ... there was a substantial possibility that [the child custody] orders had no legal effect on Cornwall" - because " he legal effect of the superior court's custody orders was an issue of law to be decided by the trial judge".
Busby's case is governed by this latter rule. Busby's understanding of the legal effect of his international driving permit -specifically, how that permit related to his revoked Alaska driver's license, and whether it authorized him to drive in Alaska despite his license revocation - was not an element of the offense. Rather, this was an issue of law to be decided by his trial judge. The trial judge committed error when she allowed Busby to offer any testimony on this issue at all - but the error ran in Busby's favor.
For these same reasons, the trial judge correctly
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Alaska DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|