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Casaday v. State3/1/2002
previously recognized that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are merely alternative methods of proving the same offense. Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1988); Bexley v. State, 705 So. 2d 549 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997). The Supreme Court has also permitted the use of uncounseled misdemeanor DUI convictions to enhance a defendant's DUI sentence if the conviction resulted in no jail time. State v. Thrasher, 783 So. 2d 103 (Ala. 2000). Likewise, this Court has permitted the use of DUI convictions from other jurisdictions for DUI sentence enhancement purposes. Bertram v. State, [CR-00-2277 Dec. 21, 2001] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2001). It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that a statute should be read to give its words their "'natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.'" R.T.M. v. State, 677 So. 2d 801, 803 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995) (quoting Ex parte Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 584 So. 2d 528, 530 (Ala. 1991)). In our opinion, a construction of subsection (b), as it is currently written, to prohibit the use of convictions obtained under that subsection (b) would undermine the deterrent effect of § 32-5A-191(b).
We note that this case is distinguishable from our decision in R.C.M. v. State, 752 So. 2d 528 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999). In R.C.M., the appellant, a juvenile, was charged with violating § 32-5A-191(a)(2). At trial, however, the juvenile court found the appellant delinquent based upon the elements set out in § 32-5A-191(b). We held:
"Because the appellant was charged with violating §32-5A-191(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, the trial court applied the incorrect standard when it referred to the requirements of §32-5A-191(b), Ala. Code 1975, in adjudicating him delinquent. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court so that that court may reconsider its ruling based on the standard set forth in §32-5A-191(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975." 752 So. 2d at 529.
Thus, our holding in R.C.M. has no application to the issue raised by Casaday.
We likewise reject Casaday's contention that Attorney General Opinion No. 2001-280 supports his claim that his conviction under § 32-5A-191(b) could not be used to enhance his conviction in the present case. Indeed, our review of this opinion supports our conclusion that a conviction under § 32-5A-191(b) may be either a conviction or an adjudication. In response to a question by the Department of Public Safety, the attorney general stated that "the Director [of Public Safety] must consider prior convictions under section 32-5A-191(a) and section 32-5A-191(b) in determining the period of suspension but may not consider prior youthful offender adjudications or findings of delinquency." Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-280 (September 17, 2001). Thus, Casaday correctly argues that this opinion may be interpreted to prohibit the use of a youthful-offender adjudication for enhancement purposes under § 32-5A-191(h). However, because we have concluded that Casaday's conviction in TR-00-2317 was a conviction, and not an adjudication under § 15-19-1, Attorney General Opinion No. 2001-280 does not affect our decision in this appeal.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly determined that Casaday had three prior convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, upon Casaday's guilty plea to this, his fourth DUI conviction, the court properly sentenced him pursuant to the felony DUI requirements provided in § 32-5A-191(h), Ala. Code 1975.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
McMillan, P.J., and Cobb and Baschab, JJ., concur. Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
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