 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Grady3/22/2002
1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The trial court concluded that Sandini was distinguishable because the attorney-client and husband-wife privileges have different public policy considerations.
In Sandini, the court addressed the use of attorney-client privileged information to establish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. The court acknowledged that the attorney could not be called by the State as a witness against his client and could not be subpoenaed to provide information against the client's interests. Id. at 1180. Similarly, the State could not surreptitiously intrude upon an exchange of information between the attorney and the client. Id. However, the court concluded that evidence voluntarily submitted by an attorney in violation of the attorney-client privilege was competent to establish probable cause in support of a search warrant. Id. at 1181. The court also noted that even though the information may constitute hearsay and be inadmissible at trial, it may nevertheless form the basis of an affidavit given in support of a search warrant. Id. at 1182. See also Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578, 590 (Fla. 1957) (reiterating "that the information forming the basis for a search warrant is not to be measured by its admissibility as evidence in the trial of the case").
Although the attorney-client and husband-wife privileges serve different purposes and may indeed have different policy considerations, both address communications that are confidential and are not intended to be disclosed to third persons. See §§ 90.502, 90.504, Fla. Stat. (2000). Neither of the privileges, nor the Florida Evidence Code in which they are both codified, addresses whether the voluntary disclosure of otherwise confidential information to law enforcement authorities, outside the context of a testimonial proceeding, somehow taints the investigation or the prosecution of criminal conduct. See ch. 90, Fla. Stat. (2000).
Grady cites no cases supporting her argument that the husband-wife privilege requires suppression of the results of an investigation or precludes the prosecution of a crime when the investigation and prosecution were initiated because one spouse, using confidential marital information, voluntarily reported criminal acts by the other spouse. We reject Grady's argument and conclude that although the husband-wife privilege may apply to exclude testimony as to confidential marital communications, the privilege does not require the suppression of admissible evidence gathered through law enforcement's investigation of her, and it does not bar her criminal prosecution. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order granting Grady's consolidated motion to suppress and motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., Concur.
|