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Lancaster v. State3/28/2002 I just -
Q: And what did the knives look like and where were they?
A: The - the knife he - the one knife was a big knife, real big knife. And it was hanging in a sheath behind the couch. And it had some holes in it, in the blade. And he was saying - another story, I think. He was saying that he made that knife. And he -
Q: And you didn't believe him?
A: No, not really. (Emphasis added.)
[ ] The appellant complains that these questions violated the principle that forbids one witness from commenting on the credibility of another witness. It is true that we have long accepted this rule of law:
This Court has consistently recognized that it is the jury's duty to resolve the factual issues, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and determine the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo.1998); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo.1988). A witness may not, therefore, comment on the veracity or truthfulness of another witness. Gayler, 957 P.2d at 860; Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373-74 (Wyo.1995). Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Wyo. 1999).
"Like opinions as to guilt, opinions as to the veracity, or lack thereof, of the victim or defendant are fundamentally objectionable if those opinions have the capacity to decide the case for the jury." Curl, 898 P.2d at 374 (emphasis in original).
[ ] There are instances, however, where testimony that appears to comment on another witness's credibility may not be objectionable. For that reason, "we must look carefully at the question asked and the testimony elicited to determine whether a witness actually made an improper comment about another witness' credibility." Huff, 992 P.2d at 1079. For instance, "testimony assisting the jury in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does not comment directly on that witness' credibility or veracity is not invasive of the role of the jury." Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 618 (Wyo. 1993). Testimony that merely has the collateral effect of supporting or denigrating another witness's credibility is not objectionable on that basis. Id.; Curl, 898 P.2d at 374.
[ ] There were no objections to this testimony at trial, so we review the record for plain error. Huff, 992 P.2d at 1078-79. We defer to the sound discretion of the trial court, reversing only where there has been an abuse of that discretion. Saldana, 846 P.2d at 618. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court "exceeds the bounds of measured reason in light of those matters properly before that court." Curl, 898 P.2d at 373. Finally, as part of his plain error burden, the appellant must demonstrate that a substantial right has been denied to him, as a result of which he has been materially prejudiced. Huff, 992 P.2d at 1079 (quoting Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo.1981)).
[ ] A narrow view of this issue would be that the only direct comment on another witness's credibility is a statement that "he told the truth" or "he lied." Such a view is too narrow. Surely, testimony that "I believed him" or "I didn't believe him" is just as much a comment on credibility. Unless the fact of this belief or disbelief is independently relevant to the issues to be determined by the jury, it is difficult to conclude that such testimony is admissible. *fn13
[ ] This Court cannot perceive anything in the record that supports the prosecutor's having asked Hanson these two credibility questions. Whether the appellant had been in the armed forces, or whether he had made the knife, did not matter. Whether Hanson believed the appellant had been in the armed forces, or whether Hanson believed the appellant had made the
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