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People v. Stamps2/7/2002
's burden of proof].)
2. Foreseeability
The court's instructions did provide the jury with a clear description of the concept of foreseeability.
The trial court gave CALJIC No. 3.36 in addition to CALJIC No. 3.40. Both describe the concept of foreseeability; that is, that the result of the criminal negligence in issue was a probable consequence of that negligence. CALJIC No. 3.36 states, in relevant part, that negligent acts which rise to the level of criminal negligence or gross negligence "must be such that the consequences of the negligent act could reasonably have been foreseen and it must appear that the [death][danger to human life] was not the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure but the natural and probable result of an aggravated, reckless or flagrantly negligent act." (CALJIC No. 3.36 (6th ed. 1996), emphasis added.) This instruction provides a complete and accurate definition of criminal negligence. (See People v. Pike (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 742.) CALJIC No. 3.40 defines "a cause" as "an [omission] that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the [omission]" the result. (CALJIC No. 3.40 (6th ed. 1996), emphasis added.)
Moreover, CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 taken together told the jurors that, in order to find appellant guilty, there must have been an unlawful act which caused the death or injury and that, if there were two or more causes of the accident and its results, the jurors must determine if each cause was a substantial factor contributing to the ultimate result, in this case the death of Anthony and injury to the other children.
Thus, under the court's instructions, appellant could have been found guilty only if the jury determined that (1) she committed an aggravated, reckless or flagrantly negligent act which was a substantial factor in bringing about the death or injuries and (2) the death or injuries were the natural and probable result of such aggravated, reckless or flagrantly negligent act, i.e., they were foreseeable. Given these instructions, we are hard pressed to comprehend appellant's assertion that the instructions "remove the question of foreseeability from the jury's consideration."
3. Intervening Cause
The trial court did not err in not instructing on the subject of an intervening cause. The prosecution's theory was that appellant was drinking and driving at excessive speeds, and made an unsafe lane change which caused her to lose control of the car, criminal acts which, when coupled with the failure to ensure the children were buckled in, caused the death of Anthony and the injuries to Alexus and Kieiko. Appellant's theory, on the other hand, was that Stauff cut her off, she swerved reactively to avoid him, and her car's steering mechanism failed when she did so, all non-criminal acts which caused the death of Anthony and the injuries to Alexus and Kieiko despite the fact that they were properly buckled in.
Appellant's case did not therefore raise an intervening cause which operated to absolve appellant of the consequences of her own illegal acts but posited a different, mutually exclusive and non-criminal cause which directly contradicted the prosecution's theory. If appellant were correct, an instruction on intervening causes would be required anytime the prosecution's evidence pointed to guilt and the defense evidence pointed to innocence, particular where the respective witnesses of the parties provided directly contradictory testimony. This surely is not the law.
C. CALJIC No. 1.00
CALJIC No. 1.00 does not unfairly mislead the jury by impermissibly lessenin
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