Hadden v. State3/15/2002
71 (Kan. 1998) (adopting rule in context of right to remain silent); Braboy v. State, 745 A.2d 471, 477-79 (Md.App. 2000) ("I want a lawyer but I can't afford a lawyer," not an unambiguous exercise of right to counsel where defendant decided to talk after he was informed that a lawyer would be appointed for him if he could not afford one); Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1999) (Goodner equivocated about whether or not he should talk without a lawyer, but ultimately signed written waiver and talked); State v. Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72-74 (Iowa App. 1998) (defendant's statement, "Is my lawyer here?" not an unambiguous request for counsel); State v. Greybull, 1998 ND 102 8-9, 14-21, 579 N.W.2d 161, 8-9, 14-21 (N.D. 1998) (defendant's statements, "You can't make me say nothing," "Do I have to get a lawyer?" and "Do I need to get a lawyer?" - ambiguous under Davis); Cothren v. State, 705 So.2d 849, 851-55 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) ("I think I want to talk to an attorney before I answer that," ambiguous under circumstances of case); but see Billups v. State, 762 A.2d 609, 614-16 (Md.App. 2000) (defendant signed signature line on form which purported to waive his rights to remain silent and have counsel, but wrote "NO" by his signature - construed to be unequivocal exercise of right to remain silent and have an attorney).
[ ] The list of cases cited above is by no means exhaustive, and we concede that there are cases to the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 6 P.3d 58, 61-62 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2000) (Washington declined to adopt Davis rule); and State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (Hawai'i 1999) (according broader rights under Hawai'i Constitution). However, we find the Davis decision and its progeny convincing, and we adopt that rule for Wyoming.
Sufficiency of Evidence
[ ] Hadden claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, particularly in light of the victim's inability to identify him as her attacker, but also because of the inherent unreliability of Hobbs's testimony, as well as the extremely circumstantial nature of the other evidence that pointed to Hadden's guilt. The benchmark for review of sufficiency of the evidence claims is whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is such as to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22 15, 18 P.3d 641, 15 (Wyo. 2001).
[ ] The victim was unable to identify Hadden, but her testimony did not eliminate him as the attacker. Hobbs testified that Hadden told him he had raped a woman in Rock Springs on the night of August 6, 1999, and that he returned to the truck they shared bloodied and in a hurry to get out of town. Hadden countered that testimony with a theory that Hobbs was telling lies in order to frame him. It was for the jury to decide Hobbs's credibility and whether he was capable of somehow making up a story such as that he told in considerable detail. The circumstantial evidence, including the hat, fuel records, phone records, and body fluids, was, perhaps, somewhat ambivalent in terms of inculpating Hadden but could serve to point to guilt in light of Hobbs's testimony. Finally, Hadden's statements to the police admitted most of the occurrence with the critical exception of the beating and the rape. It is evident from the tape of that statement that Hadden's "story" had many of the ear-markings of a lie, and that, too, is apparently what the jury decided. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reach a verdict of guilty.
Instruction Errors
[ ] Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to t
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