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State v. McCraine5/16/2003
is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Syl. Pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Com'r., 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). We undertake this task with the understanding that ambiguous criminal statutes "must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant." Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 397, 175 S.E.2d 482 (1970). We further note that in cases such as the one before us which involve multiple statutory provisions our task is to read and apply a statute
as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith. Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).
Other jurisdictions which have been faced with the similar task of determining whether criminal intent is an element of driving while a license to do so has been revoked or suspended have reached varying results. Although there is not a clear consensus among the other states which have considered similarly worded driving while revoked and notification of revocation statutes, a significant number have held that the element of knowledge of revocation must be read into the statute. Jeffcoat v. State, 639 P.2d 308 (Alaska Ct. App.1982); Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1987); State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963 (Ind. 1989); State v. McCallum, 583 A.2d 250 (Md. 1991); Zamarripa v. First Judicial District Court, 747 P. 2d 1386 (Nev. 1987); State v. Herrara, 807 P.2d 744 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Atwood, 225 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. 1976); Bryant v. State, 643 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Collova, 255 N.W.2d 581 (Wis. 1977). But see State v. Swain, 718 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1998); King v. State, 486 S.E.2d 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Johnson, 525 N.E.2d 546 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sonderleiter, 99 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1959); State v. Pickering, 432 So.2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Grotzky, 382 N.W.2d 20 (Neb. 1986); State v. Buttrey, 651 P.2d 1075 (Or. 1982).
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin summarized the reasons why it found that some requirement of guilty knowledge or criminal intent was intended by the legislature in establishing the offense by stating: The driving of a motor vehicle by one who has neither knowledge nor reason to know that his operating privilege is or may have been revoked is a wholly routine and innocent act.
Absent some unmistakable indication in the words of the statute, we are unwilling to conclude that the legislature intended to subject a defendant who is innocent of any negligent or intentional wrongdoing to the harsh consequences *fn16
a conviction . . . [the offense statute] entails. To inflict substantial punishment on a person who is innocent of any intentional or negligent wrongdoing offends the sense of justice and is ineffective." State v. Collova, 255 N.W.2d at 587-88.
Similar concern was expressed by other jurisdictions which concluded that knowledge was an implied element of the offense. *fn17
We find this reasoning persuasive. Furthermore, the overall statutory scheme, including the means by which a lawful revocation of a license is to occur, supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended that an accused have knowledge of the license revocation in order to be convicted and punished for the offense of driving revoked for DUI.
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